Water: An Emerging Issue in the Middle East?

Frey, Frederick W.; Naff, Thomas

doi:10.1177/0002716285482001005

Cited by 25 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…[32] Political variables may have affected compact allocations even though the compact process is intended to achieve equitable allocation. For instance, water negotiation theory stresses the geographical advantage of upstream nations [e.g., Frey and Naff, 1985;Wolf, 2007;Dinar, 2008] and the advantage that politically stronger parties may have because of their ability to impose punitive measures on negotiating partners via issue linkage in forums outside of water negotiations [e.g., Zeitoun and Warner, 2006;Dinar, 2008Dinar, , 2009Daoudy, 2009;Zawahri and Gerlak, 2009]. Riparian position may also imply specific legal obligations or limitations on usage.…”

Section: Data and Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[57] The upstream position on a watercourse is thought to strengthen a country's bargaining position in international water negotiations [e.g., Frey and Naff, 1985;Wolf, 2007;Dinar, 2008]. Yet the evidence in specification 2 suggests that the upstream state in interstate compacts (Ripar-ianPosition = 1) is actually penalized, receiving a lower water share by 0.124 (12.4%).…”

Section: Ols Regressionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dividing the waters: An empirical analysis of interstate compact allocation of transboundary rivers

Katz

2011

Water Resources Research

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[1] Legal scholars and jurists have identified several criteria (e.g., hydrology, climate, population, and historical water use) to guide equitable allocation of transboundary rivers among riparian claimants. Are these criteria used in practice, such that a quantitative pattern emerges from actual water-sharing agreements regarding factors affecting allocations? To address this, we study interstate compacts, the principal mechanism for allocating the waters of transboundary rivers within the United States. We develop a georeferenced data set and construct variables representing conditions in state-based watersheds of 14 rivers at the times of compact ratification. A state's water allocation share of a compact serves as the dependent variable, and a set of explanatory variables is derived from legal and political theories. We estimate allocation shares using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and bootstrap regressions, and we apply two alternative specifications of the factors affecting compact allocations, one with and one without political variables. Estimated coefficients on variables for land area, population, prior water use, riparian position, and Congressional committee chair are statistically significant in the OLS regressions. The preferred OLS specification, which includes political variables, provides a good fit (R 2 = 0.84). We also find that OLS and bootstrap regressions have a similar ability to predict state allocation shares. We discuss how the results could be used as a reference point in negotiations over new compacts or international river treaties and as a basis to identify existing compacts with statistical outliers.

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Section: Data and Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ols Regressionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dividing the waters: An empirical analysis of interstate compact allocation of transboundary rivers

Katz

2011

Water Resources Research

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“…However, the PAS does provide a baseline for comparison between possible political likelihoods of coalitional formations and is used here. Naff and Matson (1984) and Frey and Naff (1985) apply a similar approach to water conflicts in the Middle East. Their approach consists of three components: (1) motivation to participate (potential benefits); (2) riparian position regarding the water; and (3) power to prevent any coalitional arrangement.…”

Section: Water Conflicts and Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic and Political Considerations in Regional Cooperation Models

Dinar

Wolf

1997

Agric. resour. econ. rev.

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Cooperation among players requires a realization of economic benefits to all players and a meeting of efficiency requirements through economically driven allocations. Cooperation among political (and sometimes hostile) players may not meet these requirements. Political considerations, usually ignored in economic analyses, can hinder or even block possible arrangements. A framework is proposed that includes both economic and political considerations for evaluating transfers or trades of scarce resources. This method quantifies both the economic payoffs using n-person game theory and the political likelihood of any of the coalitions actually forming, using the PRINCE Political Accounting System. The economic-political approach is applied to a case of a potential water transfer in the western Middle East. Results suggest that incorporating political considerations in the analysis stabilizes the regional solution suggested by economic-related allocations.

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“…Some researchers have claimed that disproportionate power allows parties to dictate the terms of transboundary water sharing, in effect allowing for 'hydro-hegemony' (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Geographic position plays a role in power distribution, with upstream nations having the ability to unilaterally impact downstream riparians, a position traditionally viewed as politically advantageous (e.g., Frey & Naff, 1985). Some research has also found that upstream-downstream relationships are more conflictual (Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Desalination as a game-changer in transboundary hydro-politics

2014

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This article demonstrates how the availability of seawater desalination is important, not just as an additional source of water supply on a national scale, but as a potential 'game changer' in transboundary hydro-political interactions. The advent of desalination can change the nature of relations from a zero-sum game based on resource capture to a mutually beneficial business-like relationship typical in international commodity trade. It also allows for flexibility in policy approaches, and challenges the advantages and disadvantages hitherto thought of as inherent in upstream-downstream relations. This has wide ramifications for possible cooperation and conflict over international shared water resources. This study analyses the possible implications of desalination on hydropolitics, and then presents a case study of the hydro-political relations between Israel and Jordan in order to demonstrate how different aspects of transboundary political interactions are already being affected by the development of desalination. It demonstrates the ways in which the option of desalination allows states to pursue both unilateral and collaborative policies that were not practical in the period prior to desalination. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need for a revised analytical paradigm for analysis of hydro-politics in light of the development of desalination.

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Water: An Emerging Issue in the Middle East?

Cited by 25 publications

References 6 publications

Dividing the waters: An empirical analysis of interstate compact allocation of transboundary rivers

Dividing the waters: An empirical analysis of interstate compact allocation of transboundary rivers

Economic and Political Considerations in Regional Cooperation Models

Desalination as a game-changer in transboundary hydro-politics

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