Water Communities in the Republic of Macedonia: An Empirical Analysis of Membership Satisfaction and Payment Behavior

Gorton, Matthew; Sauer, Johannes; Peshevski, Mile; Bosev, Dane; Shekerinov, Darko; Quarrie, S. A.

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.04.003

Cited by 26 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Gorton et al . [] found in Macedonia that payment behavior is related to the satisfaction that farmers derived from being members of community organizations for irrigation. In contexts of institutional underdevelopment where water utilities do not have mechanisms to enforce bill payments, households may adopt nonpayment behaviors as a means to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the quality of water services [ Kayaga et al ., ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonpayment of water bills in Guatemala: Dissatisfaction or inability to pay?

Vásquez

2015

Water Resources Research

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This paper investigates nonpayment behavior in Guatemala. Determinants of nonpayment behavior are identified through zero‐inflated negative binomial regression models in order to take into account particular distributional characteristics of the amount of outstanding payments. Findings indicate that nonpayment behavior is a demonstration of consumer dissatisfaction with current water services. The amount of outstanding bill payments also responds to system unreliability. Results also suggest that nonpayment behaviors are more prominent in community‐managed systems than in municipal systems. No evidence was found on a potential relationship between nonpayment behavior and household income. Policy implications are discussed.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonpayment of water bills in Guatemala: Dissatisfaction or inability to pay?

Vásquez

2015

Water Resources Research

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“…Their absence is usually explained as being due to a relative weakness of social capital in producer communities and the lack of supportive political and administrative context (Sikor 2002;Theesfeld 2004;Upton 2008;Schlüter et al 2010;Schmidt and Theesfeld 2012). Yet, there are important exceptions, proving that such cooperative efforts can emerge even in a relatively hostile socio-political environment (Mearns 1996;Gorton et al 2009;Sutcliffe et al 2013). Our examples fall in the latter category.…”

Section: The Relevance Of Ostromian Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 81%

Organising collective reputation: An Ostromian perspective

Megyesi

Mike

2016

Int J Commons

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Abstract:What do collective reputation and communal pastures have in common? Collective reputation is an important type of collective good produced by many business networks. We argue that it has the structure of a commonpool resource, which points to the relevance of Elinor Ostrom's theory about the community governance of natural common-pool resources. After adapting the Ostromian framework to the phenomenon of collective reputation, we explore the experience of two groups of winemaking enterprises in Hungary who set up systems of quality assurance in order to protect and improve their joint reputation. We examine if the conditions identified by Ostrom as favourable for the self-governance of commons are also conducive to the governance of collective reputation. Our findings validate our conjecture that research on goal-oriented business networks may use insights from the mature theory of 'governing the commons'. Potential pathways for further research are outlined.

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“…Promoted by national governments and international agencies, many countries have transferred irrigation management responsibilities from government agencies to farmer associations or other private institutions, particularly local water user associations (WUAs), in order to actively manage local irrigation‐related resources and coordinate water use between villages and irrigation districts in the irrigation system (Huang, ; Nagrah et al, ; Qiao et al, ). Although WUAs have been regarded as a beneficial institutional arrangement for local irrigation management, their performance has been partial and uneven in practice (Araral, ; Gorton et al, ). For example, there is strong empirical evidence that WUAs potentially improve farmer welfare, such as improvements in water delivery services, increased water fee collection, lower operations and maintenance costs, prevention of opportunistic behavior in local systems, and improvement of the financial viability of irrigation systems (Gorton et al, ; Meinzen‐Dick, ; Ostrom, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although WUAs have been regarded as a beneficial institutional arrangement for local irrigation management, their performance has been partial and uneven in practice (Araral, ; Gorton et al, ). For example, there is strong empirical evidence that WUAs potentially improve farmer welfare, such as improvements in water delivery services, increased water fee collection, lower operations and maintenance costs, prevention of opportunistic behavior in local systems, and improvement of the financial viability of irrigation systems (Gorton et al, ; Meinzen‐Dick, ; Ostrom, ). Despite these potential benefits, Meinzen‐Dick () and Baland and Platteau () find that sustainable WUAs often fail to emerge in practice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Empirical Examination on the Role of Water User Associations for Irrigation Management in Rural China

Wang

2018

Water Resources Research

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Water user associations (WUAs) are commonly considered a beneficial institution to improve irrigation management. As one of the core components of irrigation reform in China, the number of WUAs has increased from a few in 1995 to nearly 100,000 today. This study examines the performance of irrigation management between villages with WUAs and villages without WUAs, with a set of 15,566 households collected in 941 randomly selected villages from 22 provinces in China. It finds that WUAs do not show overall superiority in almost all aspects in terms of improving irrigation management performance compared with traditional management institutions. Using the institutional analysis and development framework, it further demonstrates the diverse factors that jointly contribute to irrigation management performance, among which the WUAs play small role. The unsatisfactory performance of WUAs may be attributed to the absence of the conditions to support the WUAs functioning in China's centralized political system. To activate the WUAs, policies are recommended such as organizing WUAs based on hydrologic boundary, declining the overlap between the leadership of WUAs and that of the villages, endowing the WUA with more autonomy, and encouraging farmers to participate in the decision-making process. A broader implication of this study is that there are diverse policy options to address water management challenges, which can be selected according to the specific condition. Achieving the congruence between institutional design and local context holds the key for sustainable water management.

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Water Communities in the Republic of Macedonia: An Empirical Analysis of Membership Satisfaction and Payment Behavior

Cited by 26 publications

References 34 publications

Nonpayment of water bills in Guatemala: Dissatisfaction or inability to pay?

Nonpayment of water bills in Guatemala: Dissatisfaction or inability to pay?

Organising collective reputation: An Ostromian perspective

An Empirical Examination on the Role of Water User Associations for Irrigation Management in Rural China

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