Water institutional reforms in Sri Lanka

Abstract

This paper reviews water institutional reforms in Sri Lanka by contrasting those observed during the 1980s with those proposed during the 1990s. While the earlier reforms focused on the irrigation sector that yielded quicker benefits and low political risks, recent reforms have covered macro institutions and the whole water sector where the benefits are gradual and less visible but with high political risks. As the earlier reforms were packaged as part of larger investment programs, they had in-built incentives and strong proponents. But recent reforms not only lacked such conditions but also faced an ideologically charged hostile environment. Despite the current failure of the reforms, their future prospect is not that bleak in view of the emerging consensus on most issues and the continuing government commitment to reform. The Sri Lankan case also provides evidence for the effects of transaction cost and political economy factors, the tactical benefits of reform packaging, sequencing and timing, and the role of stakeholders' perception, learning and information in articulating the demand for change.

Managing shallow aquifers in the dry zone of Sri Lanka

“…The district, including municipal and urban councils, takes care of backstopping, coordination, and major implementation activities, while the divisional level is responsible for on-the-ground implementation of program components and delivery of services. No comprehensive, consistent, and coordinated data exists for groundwater in the country (Samad 2005). There are over 50 legislative enactments and 42 institutions dealing with water-related matters in Sri Lanka.…”

Institutions and transition: does a better institutional environment make water users associations more effective in Central Asia?

“…Literature on IMT experiences in many countries, particularly WUA developments, has been extensive (Svendsen ^iö/., 1997;Vermillion, 1997;Vermillion & Sagardoy, 1999;Svendsen & Murray-Rust, 2001: Saleth & Dinar, 2005Samad, 2005). Due to various underlying factors, the outcomes of IMT and its effectiveness vary in each country (Bruns et al 2001;Svendsen & Murray-Rust, 2001).…”

Decentralization of River Basin Management: A Global Analysis

“…In some cases, central government officials may have undertaken resource management decentralization initiatives in order to solve their own problems-e.g., to reduce or eliminate the central government's political accountability for past or current resource policy failures, resolve a budgetary crisis by cutting their financial responsibility for selected domestic policy areas (Simon 2002), respond to pressure from external support agencies to formulate a decentralization initiative as a condition of continued receipt of financial support, etc. In other cases it is "bottom up" pressure from the stakeholders that leads to the decentralization (Samad, 2005 Economic, political and social differences among basin users. In many countries, the distribution of political influence will be a function of economic, religious, or other social and cultural distinctions.…”