Water supply and consumption uncertainty: a conflict-equilibrium

Kogan, Konstantin; Tapiero, Charles S.

doi:10.1007/s10479-010-0724-z

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Study [13] developed a spatial water distribution plan that can save cost and time. In 2010, Kogan and Tapiero [14] discussed the economic benefits of two-stage water supply chain by constructing a zero-sum stochastic differential game model. Elala et al [15] talked about the safety of water supply chain and provided practical suggestions for communities, enterprises, and local authorities to realize water supply chain risk management.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In order to derive water resource, Kondili and Kaldellis [25] developed a decision support system (DSS) to coordinate the conflicts between customers' demand in water supply chain. In 2009, a research [14] analyzed the optimal, respectively, in the minimum commitment and flexibility contract based on a two-stage water supply chain. In 2012, a study [26] demonstrated the optimization modeling approach for the pricing and coordinating schemes of SNWD-ER project.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analysis on the Water Supply Chain Model under Revenue-Sharing Contract considering Marketing Effort, Water Purity

Huang

De-shan

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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A two-tier water supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer under revenue-sharing contract is constructed. And the contribution of the model is that marketing effort and water purity has been considered. First, four models including the centralized model (model B) and decentralized models (models BM, I, and II) are established and analyzed. Second, the Stackelberg game model is used to discuss the pricing strategy of water supply chain members in centralized and decentralized scenarios. The comparison results show that revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to improve the level of product greening, the profit of supply chain members, and the overall profit of the water supply chain compared with model BM. However, it leads to the decrease of retailers’ green marketing efforts and the wholesale price of water. In addition, revenue-sharing contract through bargaining makes bigger influence than revenue-sharing contract. Marketing can stimulate the increase of the green product’s market demand on one hand, and on the other hand, it generates the amount of marketing cost. In this study, the profit is that marketing produces cannot offset the cost that it brings. Thus, it will be important to take some measures to make up the loss that marketing generated.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis on the Water Supply Chain Model under Revenue-Sharing Contract considering Marketing Effort, Water Purity

Huang

De-shan

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…Examples of empirical approaches include Ruijs et al (2008), where the water pricing social dimension, particularly the distributional effects of water tariffs, is explored, as well as Gómez-Lobo & Contreras (2003), Komives et al (2005) and Kogan & Tapiero (2010), where the distributive impacts of water subsidy schemes relating to block pricing models are evaluated. Renzetti (2000) and GarciaValiñas (2005), who argue that a two-part tariff with a fixed and a volumetric charge might be a good way to achieve distributional objectives without substantially reducing social welfare, are other relevant contributions to the literature.…”

Section: Water Tariffs' Objectives: the 'Social Concerns' Dimensionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing social concerns in water tariffs

et al. 2012

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In the European Union, water supply services are referred to as 'services of general interest', meaning that they are subject to multiple, potentially conflicting, public service obligations. This paper considers empirical data for Portuguese municipalities and provides a comprehensive approach to assessing the social dimension hy evaluating whether the concerns of universal access to water services for hasic needs, affordability and equity are embodied in the corresponding water supply tariffs. Accordingly, 'essential minimum quantities' (EMQs) of water for representative households are calculated and then compared with the lowest tariff block's upper limit, by water utility. Next, charges underlying the EMQs are calculated and compared with the average income of each representative household, by municipality. The results show that, in general, the EMQs are enclosed in the first block of consumption and also that the corresponding water charges do not represent a disproportionate burden on average household size and income. Nonetheless, our findings indicate that, when considering the 20% poorest households, the water charges raise affordability concerns in an important number of municipalities. Further, the results show that there is a socio-economic inequity that favours the better-off households.

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“…Guerra et al [29] and Ozawa et al [30] established a framework that integrated water management, and design and planning of the shale gas supply chain. Kogan and Tapiero [31] addressed the economic efficiency of water production and distribution in a vertical supply chain consisting of a water supplier and a consumer (municipality). The study showed that when the supply variance depends on the supply mean, the effect of uncertainty depends on the intensity of the conflict between the municipality and the water supplier.…”

Section: Water Resource Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Strategies for Competitive Water Supply Chains under Different Power Structures: An Application to the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China

Fan²,

Yan

2018

Sustainability

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Abstract:Under two different power structures, where the supplier and the distributor, respectively, are modeled as the leader, this paper studies water pricing strategies in two competing water resources supply chains. We assume that each water supply chain consists of a risk-neutral water supplier and a risk-neutral water distributor. We build different decision models for two competitive water resources supply chains, derive the optimal decision strategies for the water supply chain members, and analyze how competition intensity affects these decisions. Analytical results show that when the supplier is the leader, its water wholesale price is always higher than that when the distributor serves as the leader. On the other hand, the retail price and the two supply chains' channel profits depend on the competition intensity, but are independent of the power structure. To illustrate the proposed models, we apply them to examine the water pricing strategies in the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China. The results showed significant insights into the pricing strategies of water resources in different routes of this massive water diversion project.

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Water supply and consumption uncertainty: a conflict-equilibrium

Cited by 10 publications

References 19 publications

Analysis on the Water Supply Chain Model under Revenue-Sharing Contract considering Marketing Effort, Water Purity

Analysis on the Water Supply Chain Model under Revenue-Sharing Contract considering Marketing Effort, Water Purity

Assessing social concerns in water tariffs

Pricing Strategies for Competitive Water Supply Chains under Different Power Structures: An Application to the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China

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