Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater

Biancardi, Marta; Maddalena, Lucia; Villani, Giovanni

doi:10.3934/dcdsb.2021008

Cited by 8 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…2e and f, respectively). An increase of W * c leads to an increase of net benefits (see (5)) and so social welfare raises (see Fig. 2c).…”

Section: Simulations and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…However, the problem of illegal behaviors has been investigated mostly related to tradable permits (see, among others, [1,27,29]) and particularly in fisheries (see, among others, [8,15]). 1 Otherwise, to our knowledge, only few papers deal with illegal water extraction, namely [2,5]. In both papers the population of farmers is composed of two types, compliant and non-compliant, and are studied in two different contexts, differential game the first, evolutionary game the second.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Groundwater Exploitation and Illegal Behaviors in a Differential Game

2022

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This paper studies groundwater management through a leader–follower differential game between a water agency and farmers. The access to the common pool is not free and farmers have to pay a water tax to withdraw. To save this cost, we assume that farmers may not declare all the water pumped and face the risk of being sanctioned. The water agency, on the other hand, knows that unauthorized water extraction may occur and chooses the water tax that maximizes only the legal social welfare. The value of the farmers’ evasion share is unknown ex-ante by the water agency. The game is solved using feedback Nash solution. To understand how the water agency may counter illegal behaviors, we perform numerical simulations based on the Western La Mancha (Spain) aquifer data. It emerges that the optimal path of the water table is always above the minimum level, although it is sensitive to the level of the ecosystem costs. Moreover, increasing the administrative sanction reduces the unauthorized water extraction and raises the social welfare.

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“…2e and f, respectively). An increase of W * c leads to an increase of net benefits (see (5)) and so social welfare raises (see Fig. 2c).…”

Section: Simulations and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Groundwater Exploitation and Illegal Behaviors in a Differential Game

2022

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“…Ouyang (2022) also found that a water resource taxation policy improved water-use efficiency and optimized water-use structures [20]. Biancardi et al (2021) used a differential game approach to analyze user and public authority behavior. They found that, in a noncooperative case, imposing a water tax has a significant positive effect on protecting public groundwater resources [21].…”

Section: Water Resource Taxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does the Water Resource Tax Reform Bring Positive Effects to Green Innovation and Productivity in High Water-Consuming Enterprises?

Xu,

Gao,

Hua

et al. 2024

Water

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Water resources are a fundamental natural and strategic economic resource and are closely related to high-quality economic and societal development. This paper uses the pilot implementation of the water resource tax reform to explore the impact of that reform on the green innovation and total factor productivity of enterprises. The study sample includes data for high water-consuming A-share listed enterprises in Shenzhen and Shanghai, China, from 2007 to 2021; the double-difference method was used for the analysis. Study findings indicate that replacing water resource fees with taxes significantly improves the green innovation level and total factor productivity of enterprises. Green innovation has a significant partial mediating effect between the water resource tax reform and total factor productivity. The water resource tax reform promotes green innovation in enterprises, enhancing total factor productivity. When considering different types of enterprise property rights, the economic effect of the water resource tax reform is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, compared to state-owned enterprises. This paper provides empirical evidence for expanding the pilot scope of the water resource tax reform.

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“…With the growing shortfall between water availability and agricultural demand in the state (Haddeland et al 2014, the illegal extraction of water for irrigation has received increased attention (Martínez-Santos et al 2008, Budds 2009, De Stefano andLopez-Gunn 2012). The amount of water illegally extracted can be substantial and create significant hurdles to effective water use policy for regulated agriculture (Biancardi et al 2021). Illegal water use is especially common in systems that are difficult to monitor and enforce, including streams in remote areas and groundwater sources (Roseta-Palma et al 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Water demands of permitted and unpermitted cannabis cultivation in Northern California

Dillis

Butsic²,

Georgakakos³

et al. 2023

Environ. Res. Commun.

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Illicit water use for irrigated agriculture can have substantial impacts on the environment and complicates water management decision-making. Water demand for illicit cannabis farming in California has long been considered a threat to watershed health, yet an accounting of cannabis irrigation has remained elusive, thereby impeding effective water policy for the state’s nascent legal cannabis industry. Using data obtained from both permitted and unpermitted cultivation operations, the current study applies novel water-use models to cannabis farms in Northern California to estimate their cumulative and relative water footprints. Our results indicated substantial variation in total water extraction volumes for cannabis farming between watersheds and that most cannabis water use was concentrated in a subset of watersheds, rather than evenly spread across the landscape. Water extraction volumes for unpermitted cannabis were consistently greater than permitted cannabis in the dry season, when streams are most vulnerable to impacts from water diversions. Results from scenario modeling exercises indicated that if all existing unpermitted farms were to become permitted and comply with regulations that prohibit surface water diversions in the dry season, nearly one third (34 of 115) of the study watersheds would experience a 50% reduction in dry season water extraction. In comparison, modest expansion of off-stream storage by all cannabis farms could reduce dry season extraction by 50% or greater in more than three quarters (96 of 115) of study watersheds. Combining diversion limits with enhanced storage could achieve dry season extraction reductions of 50% or greater in 100 of 115 watersheds. Our findings suggest that efforts to address the environmental impacts of unpermitted cultivation should focus on watersheds with greatest water demands and that programs that support expansion of off-stream storage can be helpful for reducing pressures on the environment and facilitating the transition of unpermitted farms to the regulated market.

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Water taxes and fines imposed on legal and illegal firms exploiting groudwater

Cited by 8 publications

References 21 publications

Groundwater Exploitation and Illegal Behaviors in a Differential Game

Groundwater Exploitation and Illegal Behaviors in a Differential Game

Does the Water Resource Tax Reform Bring Positive Effects to Green Innovation and Productivity in High Water-Consuming Enterprises?

Water demands of permitted and unpermitted cannabis cultivation in Northern California

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