“We are Zambians—Don’t Tell Us How to Fish!” Institutional Change, Power Relations and Conflicts in the Kafue Flats Fisheries in Zambia

Haller, Tobias; Merten, Sonja

doi:10.1007/s10745-008-9191-4

Cited by 57 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Conflicts have arisen over the overuse of fisheries in the Kafue Flats, a floodplain in Zambia close to the capital Lusaka, due to erosion of local institutions and to the weakness of state institutions, leading to a de facto open-access constellation from which immigrant fishers and fish traders profit (Haller and Merten 2008;. The erosion of local institutions to manage the fisheries emerged from political, economic, and major institutional changes in this seasonally inundated floodplain, which covers 6500 km 2 in an otherwise semi-arid area and harbors a rich variety of fish (tilapia, alestes, and others), as well as antelope and other game species.…”

Section: Case Study Zambia: Crafting Local By-laws For the Fisheries mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the Ila are largely agro-pastoralists, fishing has been one of their major sources for protein, and regulations were adapted to floods (see Haller and Merten 2008;Haller 2013). The Ila had big men who were the political elite who augmented their social capital by attracting followers through giving out access to common pool resources managed as common property, including land, pasture, and hunting rights.…”

Section: T Haller Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These immigrants, invoking the ideology and discourse of being citizens of the state entitled to use a state resource, used outlawed techniques in their fishing, as the state was not present to monitor and sanction unruly actions. A de facto open-access situation resulted, exemplifying the paradox labeled the ''presence-absence'' of the state (Haller and Merten 2008;.…”

Section: T Haller Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Year-round fishing using very fine-meshed nets and a lack of attention to preserving fish breeding grounds led to a decline in catch from 11,000 MT to 4,000 to 2,000 MT (see Haller and Merten 2008;Haller 2013). According to local informants, several fish species have not been present for many years.…”

Section: T Haller Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the long-run results of this process remain unclear: Local interest groups emphasized in 2011 that external fishermen now tend to avoid the area or change their fishing gear to be in compliance, and, as a result, catches are better again and some species have returned. However, the by-laws could not be ratified on the district level, which will erode their eventual effectiveness (Haller and Merten 2008;Chabwela and Haller 2010).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Constitutionality: Conditions for Crafting Local Ownership of Institution-Building Processes

Haller

Acciaioli

Rist

2015

Society & Natural Resources

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Section: Case Study Zambia: Crafting Local By-laws For the Fisheries mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: T Haller Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: T Haller Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: T Haller Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Constitutionality: Conditions for Crafting Local Ownership of Institution-Building Processes

Haller

Acciaioli

Rist

2015

Society & Natural Resources

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An Ethnographic Analysis of the Role of Power in Institutional Arrangements: Borehole cost recovery within a pastoral community in North‐Western Namibia

Schwieger

2015

Env Pol Gov

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The role of power in the development of institutions governing the use of common-pool resources has been given little emphasis in the leading theories in this field. A case study from north-western Namibia illustrates how power and bargaining strategies shape institutional arrangements concerning the cost recovery of a communal water point. The example shows how policy reforms based on Ostrom's design principles clash with local dynamics of power asymmetries and social interdependencies. This article indicates that Ostrom's framework does not consider the possibility that resource appropriators might develop and implement institutions that disadvantage the less powerful members of a community. To explain how such 'unfair' institutions evolve and endure, Knight's bargaining theory of institutions is offered as a supplementary model. After discussion, the article concludes with an outlook prompting a reassessment of the concepts of 'institutional failure' in which only environmental factors are implicated, while social ones are ignored. 1 This part of Namibia is characterized by marginal integration in labour and sales markets, and pastoralism is the main economic activity performed by its inhabitants. Droughts occur from time to time in this semi-arid area (200-300 mm per year), occasionally with catastrophic consequences (Bollig, 2006). 2 These principles are given to the communities in written form and in a standardized way; they are the basis of the 'water point constitution'. 3 These consist of eight maxims: (1) definition of group boundaries; (2) regulations for the appropriation and provision of the common-pool resource that conform with local conditions; (3) arrangements that allow resource appropriators to participate in the decision-making process; (4) monitoring by supervisors accountable to, or part of, the appropriators' group; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) low-cost and accessible mechanisms of conflict resolution; (7) recognition by higher-level authorities of the appropriators' self-determination; and, in the case of larger systems of common-pool resources, (8) an organization in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises.In the past, the community had a diesel pump instead of the hand pump for two periods: once in the 1970s under the colonial administration, and later under the independent state rule, commencing in the 1990s. On both occasions, the diesel pumps were in operation for only a relatively short time, as it was an underground problem in the borehole itself that limited the amount of water that could be pumped to the surface. During the respective periods during which these diesel pumps were in operation, the 'homeland', as well as the Namibian independent administration, provided the community with diesel, carried out the necessary maintenance, and paid one villager to take care of and operate the pump. According to my informants, the competent authorities delivered diesel on time and carried out repairs shortly after the problem was reported. 11These appraisals constituted a ...

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Social Dynamics of the North Central European Plains, 600–900s CE: A Model

Lozny

2013

SpringerBriefs in Anthropology

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“We are Zambians—Don’t Tell Us How to Fish!” Institutional Change, Power Relations and Conflicts in the Kafue Flats Fisheries in Zambia

Abstract: Many scholars claim that open access due to the effective absence of state control is the major reason for the overuse of common-pool resources such as fisheries.

Cited by 57 publications

References 22 publications

Constitutionality: Conditions for Crafting Local Ownership of Institution-Building Processes

Constitutionality: Conditions for Crafting Local Ownership of Institution-Building Processes

An Ethnographic Analysis of the Role of Power in Institutional Arrangements: Borehole cost recovery within a pastoral community in North‐Western Namibia

Social Dynamics of the North Central European Plains, 600–900s CE: A Model

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