Weak Assertion

Abstract

We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection; we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. This demonstrates that an inferentialist approach to meaning can be successfully extended beyond the core logical constants.

Quasirealism as semantic dispensability

“…They assume a quasirealist is a metaethical expressivist. But expressivism has been proposed for other aspects of language, notably epistemic modals (Yalcin 2007;and Incurvati and Schlöder 2019). An expressivist of this sort will likely want to be a quasirealist about epistemic possibilities (e.g., epistemically possible worlds).…”

Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem

“…The possibility of com-bining expressivism with inferentialism is acknowledged (Chrisman 2008;Baker and Woods 2015;Tiefensee 2016), but we are the first to develop it systematically and give the formal details of an inferential expressivist account of normative language. Moreover, our inferential expressivism includes an account of epistemic modals (Incurvati and Schlöder 2019). Building on this prior work, our account also explains how epistemic modals interact with normative vocabulary, improving on Mark Schroeder's (2008a) analysis, which encounters difficulties with sentences like Murdering might be wrong.…”

“…Inferentialists claim that inferential roles best characterise use (Dummett 1991;Brandom 1994). Inferential expressivism combines these views by specifying the meaning of an expression in terms of the attitudes one can infer from the use of sentences that contain that expression (Chrisman 2008;Incurvati and Schlöder 2019).…”

“…This is cognitively implausible. However, the proper understanding of inferred assent here is social: the meaningconferring rules determine which attitudes one is committed to having (see also Dutilh Novaes 2015; Incurvati and Schlöder 2017). Someone who assents to A and to B need not assent to A ∧ B, since she may fail to draw the inference corresponding to (+∧I.).…”

“…We propose to solve the negation problem by adopting the framework of inferential expressivism. Inferential expressivism is a general semantic framework that has its roots in the bilateral programme in logic (Rumfitt 2000;Incurvati and Schlöder 2017). Very briefly, expressivism explains terms by reference to the attitudes they are used to express, inferentialism explains terms by reference to the inferences they feature in, and inferential expressivism explains terms by reference to what attitudes one can infer from their use.…”