Weapons and the Law of Armed Conflict

Lethal autonomous weapon systems: Translating legal jargon for engineers

“…[15] The means aspect of this Article 36 review requires a look at not just the weapon itself but also any system or equipment that delivers force to the adversary. [16] Thus, an autonomous system that provides ISR capabilities utilized by an offensive weapon system (like an F-35) would fall within the "means" umbrella and require a legal review. [17] The methods terminology requires states to review the ways in which weapons are used in armed conflict.…”

“…Engineers should be ready to explain how the sensors and guidance system technology enable the autonomous weapon system to be aimed and direct its attack at a military target. [27] Somewhat counterintuitively, the AWS does not have to be capable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets in order to be a per se legal weapon system. [28] At this stage of the analysis, attorneys are determining whether any environment exists such that the weapon could be legally employed.…”

The Role of the Ethical Underpinnings of International Humanitarian Law in the Age of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

“…The current discussion about the legality of new military technologies is marked by two issues with are both somehow opposed and connected. One can easily find an argument raised by States and subject matter experts that the current paradigm of international humanitarian law (IHL), that is the balancing of considerations of humanity and military necessity, is sufficient and always operative (Boothby, 2016;Schmitt, Thurner, 2013;Wagner, 2014). But at the same time, since this argument is not fully convincing there is a growing recognition of a need to refresh and bolster the theory underpinning this predominantly practical branch of law (Arkin, 2009;Asaro, 2012;Crootof, 2016;Liu, 2012).…”

Left of bang interventions in trauma: some legal implications of military medical prophylaxis

“…What is rather at stake in the context of LOB-ITs is the prohibition of weapons, means and methods of warfare that, to use the language of article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I, are ‘of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’. This principle involves a balancing act between the impact of a weapon on a person and the intended military advantage to be gained from the use of the weapon 10. Thus, a purely antipersonnel weapon would be prohibited if it caused pain and suffering to the combatant that was not required for the weapon to achieve its purpose—the incapacitation (up to and including the death) of the combatant.…”