In her recent book Imaginal Politics, Chiara Bottici remarks upon 'the privileged attention that, at least since Plato, philosophers gave to end of life over other experiences of it -and, most notably, over its beginning '. 1 This is an important observation and provocation. After all, it is in the death of Socrates that Western philosophy finds its founding myth. Plato rationalizes Socrates' impending demise at the hands of the Athenian city-state by declaring philosophy to be 'nothing other than dying, and being dead', presenting philosophy as a practice of death, a yearning toward the state of incorporeal intellectual contemplation only truly achievable once the immortal soul has been sundered from the encumbrance of its mortal body, orienting itself toward a 'thought unalloyed, alone and by itself'.2 In the death of Socrates, writes Jean-Luc Nancy, 'the event of sacrifice proper … the actual putting to death, merely punctuates and lays open the process and the truth of a life that is itself sacrificial through and through', exposing the demands of a truly philosophical life defined by the renunciation of all corporeal exigency.
3Surely the most prominent figuration of death within philosophy though comes courtesy of Martin Heidegger, for whom our certain demise marks the ultimate horizon toward which we project ourselves (the 'finitude of temporality'), forming a crucial component of the authentic and primordial time of anticipatory resoluteness. 4 Bottici challenges this Heideggerian perspective, insisting that it is birth, rather than death, which constitutes our truly primordial experience, 'since we can be beings-toward-death only because we are beings-after-birth' (IP, 69).5 In taking such a viewpoint, reorienting ourselves in relation to birth rather than death, it immediately comes to light that we have arrived on the scene literally to-gether with an-other human being. Even before being born, we were accompanied. Communication begins in the womb and never stops thereafter. Only death will put an end to it. At the very beginning, it is a prelinguistic form of communication, but precisely for this reason it is perhaps an even stronger one based on the sharing of the same body (IP, 69).Being-toward-death imprints upon our lives the telos of mortal finitude, our impending demise the horizon that stands before us, marking the irreducible singularity of our existence, for death 'is indeed the only event in our life when we are completely monadic' (IP, 68). Being-after-birth then might conversely disclose an originary coupling or sociality, what Bracha Ettinger describes as a matrixial encounter-event 'between the subject-to-be and the becoming-mother', that compromises any such claim to singularity. 6 It is this sense of co-belonging, inaugurated prior to birth, that Peter Sloterdijk attempts to give ontological significance in the first volume of the Spheres trilogy, asserting that 'investigating humans philosophically means, first and foremost: examining paired structures', with the mother and child be...