Web MIXes: A System for Anonymous and Unobservable Internet Access

Berthold, Oliver; Federrath, Hannes; Köpsell, Stefan

doi:10.1007/3-540-44702-4_7

Cited by 266 publications

(207 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…In contrast to Tor, JAP [6] requires that operators promise not to engage in malicious behaviour before being admitted. JAP is also a cascade system, in which traffic from all users flow over the same path.…”

Section: Threat Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metrics for Security and Performance in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems

Murdoch

Watson

Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Abstract. In this paper we explore the tradeoffs between security and performance in anonymity networks such as Tor. Using probability of path compromise as a measure of security, we explore the behaviour of various path selection algorithms with a Tor path simulator. We demonstrate that assumptions about the relative expense of IP addresses and cheapness of bandwidth break down if attackers are allowed to purchase access to botnets, giving plentiful IP addresses, but each with relatively poor symmetric bandwidth. We further propose that the expected latency of data sent through a network is a useful performance metric, show how it may be calculated, and demonstrate the counter-intuitive result that Tor's current path selection scheme, designed for performance, both performs well and is good for anonymity in the presence of a botnetbased adversary.

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Section: Threat Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metrics for Security and Performance in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems

Murdoch

Watson

Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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“…Figure 2 shows the typical architecture of an anonymity service (cf. [7,11,14]). Mixes and clients form an overlay network.…”

Section: Designing a Workload Model For Anonymity Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the original proposal by David Chaum in 1981 [9] a large number of mixing schemes for various application areas has been published. Especially low-latency anonymity services like Tor [11] and JAP (JonDonym) [7] have found widespread adoption.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Generating Realistic Application Workloads for Mix-Based Systems for Controllable, Repeatable and Usable Experimentation

Fuchs

Herrmann

Federrath

2013

Security and Privacy Protection in Information Processing Systems

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“…PAR [2] proposes a micropayment model where clients pay coins for each circuit, and relays can use these coins for service of their own or convert them into actual payments; however, its dependency on an ecash bank means it remains a theoretical design. Lastly, the AN.ON project's cascade-based network was directly funded by the German government as part of a research project [4]. Unfortunately, the funding ended in 2007, so they are exploring the community support approach (several of their nodes are now operated by other universities) and the pay-for-play approach (setting up commercial cascades that provide more reliable service).…”

Section: Incentives In Anonymous Communication Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Incentives into Tor

Ngan

Dingledine

Wallach

2010

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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Abstract. Distributed anonymous communication networks like Tor depend on volunteers to donate their resources. However, the efforts of Tor volunteers have not grown as fast as the demands on the Tor network. We explore techniques to incentivize Tor users to relay Tor traffic too; if users contribute resources to the Tor overlay, they should receive faster service in return. In our design, the central Tor directory authorities measure performance and publish a list of Tor relays that should be given higher priority when establishing circuits. Simulations of our proposed design show that conforming users receive significant improvements in performance, in some cases experiencing twice the network throughput of selfish users who do not relay traffic for the Tor network.

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Web MIXes: A System for Anonymous and Unobservable Internet Access

Cited by 266 publications

References 3 publications

Metrics for Security and Performance in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems

Metrics for Security and Performance in Low-Latency Anonymity Systems

Generating Realistic Application Workloads for Mix-Based Systems for Controllable, Repeatable and Usable Experimentation

Building Incentives into Tor

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