Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

Reisner, Andrew

doi:10.1007/s11098-006-0007-3

Cited by 65 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Important related discussions appear in Booth (2014aBooth ( & 2014b and Reisner (2008Reisner ( & 2015, and Reisner and Van Weelden (2015). ⁵⁴ See Danielsson and Olson (2007) and Reisner (2009) for the 'eyes on the prize' argument in favour of treating the incentives as direct pragmatic reasons for belief.…”

Section: The No Positive Normative Judgement Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

Reisner

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In some circumstances, a wedge may be driven between what is advantageous or beneficial to believe and what is true. Cases range from the exotic—with diabolical forces conspiring to punish a hapless victim for believing the truth—to the mundane—with excessive optimism increasing one’s chances of success at some tasks. In contemporary discussions about normative reasons for belief, it is often argued or assumed that all reasons for belief arise only from epistemological considerations. This chapter assesses the case for the contrary claim: that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. The chapter begins with a discussion of the standard arguments for and against non-ecumenical evidentialism. After concluding that case for non-ecumenical evidentialism is tenuous, the chapter canvasses and assesses the diverse range of arguments in favor of there being pragmatic reasons for belief.

show abstract

Section: The No Positive Normative Judgement Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

Reisner

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For a worked out version of the former approach in the epistemic sphere, see Reisner (2008). ²⁰ For more on the sources of normativity, see Broome (2013), Guindon (MS), and Reisner (2004).…”

Section: Conflicts and The Structure Of Normativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity

Reisner¹

2015

Weighing and Reasoning

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…See also Kelly, 2007. For similar suggestions by philosophers not participating in the debate over belief's aim, see Hyman, 2006; Reisner, 2008.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?

Whiting

2012

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief's aim using the notion of truth. In this paper, by considering whether they can account for belief's standard of correctness and the epistemic norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief's aim given in terms of truth and advance a neglected alternative.It should not be imagined that there is much to endure in the search after truth.

show abstract

Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

Cited by 65 publications

References 0 publications

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity

Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About