2021
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2021.1950666
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Weighing the moral worth of altruistic actions: A discrepancy between moral evaluations and prescriptive judgments

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Cited by 6 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Indeed, helping a stranger could hardly bring the same sense of bonding. At the same time, studies show that such acts are judged as having more moral value than helping kin or in-group (Deviatko & Bykov, 2021; McManus et al, 2020) since people have no special obligations to strangers and can hardly expect reciprocation from them in the future. While it is impossible to derive the knowledge of the motive from the relationship closeness with the recipient, benefiting a stranger is less likely to be guided by self-interest and thus comes closer to what could be considered a genuinely altruistic deed.…”
Section: Different Paths To Happinessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, helping a stranger could hardly bring the same sense of bonding. At the same time, studies show that such acts are judged as having more moral value than helping kin or in-group (Deviatko & Bykov, 2021; McManus et al, 2020) since people have no special obligations to strangers and can hardly expect reciprocation from them in the future. While it is impossible to derive the knowledge of the motive from the relationship closeness with the recipient, benefiting a stranger is less likely to be guided by self-interest and thus comes closer to what could be considered a genuinely altruistic deed.…”
Section: Different Paths To Happinessmentioning
confidence: 99%