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Abstract

The French Cour des comptes is one of the numerous Supreme Audit Institutions which oversee proper use of public funds. This research project on the Cour des comptes is intended notably to establish how the Court has integrated the broad principles governing the function of supreme audit institutions (SAI) as established in the Lima Declaration adopted in 1977 by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), which France signed, together with nearly 190 other countries. We conclude with an examination of the risks inherent in the Court’s necessary passage from tradition to modernity at the dawn of the twenty-first century, and of its capacity to change its world vision. The analysis of the way in which the Court has integrated the broad principles governing the operation of supreme audit institutions has brought to light serious flaws in the Court’s invariant structures, flaws which necessitate a recomposition, in the sense put forward by Jean-François Kahn (2006). The recomposition of the Court’s invariant structure heralds a revolution at its core. Tradition, prestige, ritual and symbolism can no longer serve as ramparts against modernity and its imperatives of accelerating change. The Court’s very survival as a credible and effective supreme audit institution is therefore at stake. Points for practitioners The equidistant position that the Court claims to maintain between Parliament and the Government is a theoretical concept whose applicability remains to be proven. The Court’s status of financial jurisdiction contradicts the flux of its activities: the proportion of jurisdictional activities is giving way to non-jurisdictional activities from year to year. The apparent neutrality of the magistrates of the Court can be questioned in light of the successive appointments of the First Presidents of the Court in the last two decades. The professionalization of the mission of the Court will inevitably prompt a reexamination of the status of the magistrate and the skills newly required to successfully carry out the unprecedented mandates conferred on the Court.

Supreme audit institutions in a high‐impact context: A comparative analysis of performance audit in four Nordic countries

“…Since Van Loocke and Put () conducted their review, several other empirical impact studies have been published, including Morin (, ), Raudla, Taro, Agu, and Douglas (), Reichborn‐Kjennerud (), Reichborn‐Kjennerud and Johnsen (), and Torres et al. ().…”

“…(). These studies indicate different levels of impacts, from relatively low impact in countries using no systematic or a French (court model) accountability regime (Morin, ), to modest impact in Canada (Morin, ) and Estonia (Raudla et al., ), and high impact in countries using an Anglo‐American (UK‐Nordic) (Reichborn‐Kjennerud, ; Reichborn‐Kjennerud & Johnsen, ) or Germanic way (Torres et al., ). What seems to determine the positive impacts – that is, that the audits result in actions being taken – is the presence of a legal mandate for the performance audit.…”

Democratic Accountability During Performance Audits Under Pressure: A Recipe for Institutional Hypocrisy?

“…The French Cour des comptes claims to be independent from both legislative and executive power. Its status of jurisdiction, the irremovability of its magistrates and the freedom to establish its program of control and inquiry grant the Court the independence that Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) require (Morin, ). When the Court performs what it calls management control missions (performance audits), it interacts directly with representatives of the Administration.…”

“…As part of the implementation of the Loi organique relative aux lois de finances (LOLF) in 2001 and the appointment of Philippe Séguin as First President of the Court in 2004, the Court slowly assumed an equidistant position between Parliament and the Government (Morin, ). The successor of the late Philippe Séguin, Didier Migaud, has apparently endorsed this vision of relations between the Court, Parliament and the Government.…”

Les auditeurs législatifs : héros intouchables ?

“…Les études reconnaissent aussi la nécessité d'une véritable indépendance de fait et d'esprit des auditeurs législatifs à l'égard du pouvoir exécutif (Funnell, 1994 ;Morin, 2010 ;Norton et Smith, 2008 ;Wheat, 1991).…”