2015 IEEE 56th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2015
DOI: 10.1109/focs.2015.95
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Welfare Maximization with Limited Interaction

Abstract: We continue the study of welfare maximization in unit-demand (matching) markets, in a distributed information model where agent's valuations are unknown to the central planner, and therefore communication is required to determine an efficient allocation. Dobzinski, Nisan and Oren (STOC'14) showed that if the market size is n, then r rounds of interaction (with logarithmic bandwidth) suffice to obtain an n 1/(r+1) -approximation to the optimal social welfare. In particular, this implies that such markets conve… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(57 citation statements)
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“…Third implication: distributed simultaneous communication. Maximum matching (and to a lesser degree vertex cover) has been studied previously in the simultaneous communication model owing to many applications of this model, including in achieving round-optimal distributed algorithms [12], proving lower bounds for dynamic graph streams [7,13,14,54], and applications to mechanism design [9,32,33]. As an application of Result 1, we obtain the following corollary.…”
Section: First Result: Improved Algorithms Via a New Randomized Coresetmentioning
confidence: 74%
“…Third implication: distributed simultaneous communication. Maximum matching (and to a lesser degree vertex cover) has been studied previously in the simultaneous communication model owing to many applications of this model, including in achieving round-optimal distributed algorithms [12], proving lower bounds for dynamic graph streams [7,13,14,54], and applications to mechanism design [9,32,33]. As an application of Result 1, we obtain the following corollary.…”
Section: First Result: Improved Algorithms Via a New Randomized Coresetmentioning
confidence: 74%
“…In this paper, we resolve the aforementioned open question of Dobzinski et al [9] and Alon et al [2] by proving an almost tight round-approximation tradeoff for polynomial communication protocols in subadditive combinatorial auctions.…”
Section: Our Results and Techniquesmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Similar to [2], and unlike typical two-player round-elimination arguments (see, e.g. [23,27]), eliminating a round in our round-elimination argument requires a reduction from "low dimensional" instances (with fewer players and items) to "high dimensional" instances.…”
Section: Our Results and Techniquesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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