Welfare Standards in U.S. And EU Antitrust Enforcement

Blair, Roger D.; Sokol, D. Daniel

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2195938

Cited by 10 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The setting under which products are provided by the public firm can be regarded as analogous to a perfectly competitive situation. 28 There are still hot debates on the goals of competition laws (e.g., so-called "total surplus criteria" and "consumer surplus criteria") (Blair and Sokol, 2013). For instance, Kaplow (2010) discusses the usage of the term "consumer welfare" in the context of antitrust policy.…”

Section: Welfare Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Competition between branded and nonbranded firms and its impact on welfare

Pan

2020

Southern Economic Journal

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We examine a quantity competition among branded and nonbranded firms. The market comprises two consumer segments: one purchases only branded products (the high-end market), while the other segment's consumers purchase less expensive products (the low-end market). When branded firms take actions sequentially, we show that the branded leader has an incentive to restrict its quantity to avoid entering the low-end market. As the follower recognizes this incentive, it can restrict the leader by implementing a quantity constraint, which is affected by the number of nonbranded firms. We find that both the branded leader and follower could benefit from the nonbranded firms and that the leader prefers to have more nonbranded firms in the market than the follower does. Furthermore, we show that the free entry of nonbranded firms could negatively affect total surplus as well as consumer surplus even without any costs, because of the premium pricing of branded products.

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Section: Welfare Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…28 28 There are still hot debates on the goals of competition laws (e.g., so‐called “total surplus criteria” and “consumer surplus criteria”) (Blair and Sokol, 2013). For instance, Kaplow (2010) discusses the usage of the term “consumer welfare” in the context of antitrust policy.…”

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confidence: 99%

Competition between branded and nonbranded firms and its impact on welfare

Pan

2020

Southern Economic Journal

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“…In fact, the choice of welfare standard is divided into two. As explained by Blair and Sokol (2013), section III), the United States and European Union apply consumer welfare (consumer surplus) as their criterion. Japan also uses consumer surplus (see Wakui, 2018, p. 130).…”

Section: Policy Implications and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality‐improving R&D and merger policy in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria

Takashima

Ouchida

2020

Manage Decis Econ

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We combine a model of product research and development (R&D) and technological spillover with the concept of technological distance and examine horizontal mergers in a duopolistic market with R&D. The results are fourfold. First, a merger can better encourage R&D investment than the competition case. Second, with a small degree of product differentiation (PD), the merger criterion under the Cournot duopoly is stricter than that of the Bertrand case. By contrast, with a moderate or large degree of PD, the opposite is true. Third, with a small technological distance, a merger should be allowable. Finally, with a small degree of PD and moderate technological distance, a merger should be allowable.

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“…Both Posner and Shavell suggested that dispersion of harm, hidden actions, and wealth constraints would imply that penalty regulation beyond mere compensation for harm would be required to maintain deterrence 1 . The need for more scientific inquiry into the criminalization of cartel offenses has been raised by the United States Sentencing Commission in its request in 2014 for public interest comments on sentencing, and by a focus on welfare effects in the academic literature (Blair & Sokal, 2013).…”

Section: Legal Design and Antitrust Lawmentioning

confidence: 99%

Criminalizing price‐fixing

Dnes¹,

Swaray

2020

Manage Decis Econ

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We assess whether recent US Department of Justice (DOJ) price‐fixing cases exhibit characteristics that are associated theoretically with optimal use of criminal law. We take our welfare standard from seminal work on optimal legal design. Optimal legal design recognizes the private and public elements present in all areas of the law. The mixed results show that the characteristics to be expected in criminal cases are not all present in the DOJ cases. Criminal sanctions applied in these collusive antitrust cases do however show significant responsiveness to some of the variables derived from the economic analysis of criminal law.

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Welfare Standards in U.S. And EU Antitrust Enforcement

Cited by 10 publications

References 18 publications

Competition between branded and nonbranded firms and its impact on welfare

Competition between branded and nonbranded firms and its impact on welfare

Quality‐improving R&D and merger policy in a differentiated duopoly: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria

Criminalizing price‐fixing

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