Welfarism in Economic Domains

Abstract

In economies with pub1ic goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare 01' any of them. Journal ol Economic Literature Classitication Numbers: 063; H41.

Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Some Recent Developments

“…Obviously, payoff monotonicity cannot be justified by either axiomatic formulation of equality of resources or the principles of responsibility and compensation. Thus, though the characterization result by Ginés and Marhuenda (2000) and Chen and Maskin (1999) is elegant, it has no implication of the equality of resources, unlike Roemer ( , 1988 and Yoshihara (2003Yoshihara ( , 2006).…”

“…In this way, the well-known solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems can be characterized from the viewpoint of equality of resourcesà la Dworkin (1981b) by reformulating the classical bargaining problems as the standard resource allocation problems in economic environments. In addition to Roemer ( , 1988 and Yoshihara (2003Yoshihara ( , 2006 introduced in this subsection, Ginés and Marhuenda (2000) and Chen and Maskin (1999) also respectively provide an axiomatic characterization of the egalitarian solution by considering the economic models with finite dimensional commodity spaces. In these works, the egalitarian solution is characterized by means of Pareto efficiency, weak symmetry, and payoff monotonicity.…”

Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information

“…) and several other settings such as production and exchange economies (for references, see Gines andMarhuenda, 2000 andSprumont, 1996). Ginés and Marhuenda (2000), (we will refer as GM hereafter), study a continuous public good production economy where agents have quasilinear utilities.…”

“…) and several other settings such as production and exchange economies (for references, see Gines andMarhuenda, 2000 andSprumont, 1996). Ginés and Marhuenda (2000), (we will refer as GM hereafter), study a continuous public good production economy where agents have quasilinear utilities. They characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms by focusing on the three key properties considered by Kalai in characterizing egalitarian solution: Pareto efficiency, symmetry (agents with the same characteristics/preferences should be treated equally), and monotonicity (enlarging the pie to be shared should not hurt anyone).…”