Well-Being

Griffin, James

doi:10.1093/0198248431.001.0001

Cited by 116 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…For desire theorists, death is a harm because it deprives the individual of the satisfaction of future desires. Other philosophers say that certain goods are valuable irrespective of whether they are pleasurable or desired (Griffin 1986;Finnis 2011). In line with the so-called 'objective list' theory of well-being, death is bad because it deprives you of goods like relationships, achievements, knowledge, creative pursuits or, in the case of nonhuman animals, a species-typical life (Nussbaum 2004).…”

Section: The Deprivation Theory Of the Harm Of Deathmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does a painless death harm an invertebrate?

Hadley

2019

Australian Zoologist

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This paper explains a meaningful sense in which a painless death can be a misfortune for an invertebrate. The account presented is a logical implication of bringing together two distinct pieces of theory: the deprivation account of the harm of death and the biocentric ethical theory developed by the New Zealand philosopher, Nicholas Agar. Combined, the two theories support the following thesis: death harms an invertebrate because it deprives the individual of future biopreference satisfaction.

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Section: The Deprivation Theory Of the Harm Of Deathmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does a painless death harm an invertebrate?

Hadley

2019

Australian Zoologist

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“…Clearly, these preferences can be base or cultured, rich or superficial, and share a desire in utility to prevent pain and enhance pleasure. Their commonality is in hedonism, informed (having an appreciation of the nature of the objects of desire and its prudential impact (Griffin, 1988) or doxic. Their satisfaction can be achieved by a confluence of concepts that produce occurrent enjoyment or dispositional happiness (Davis, 1981;Haybron, 2009).…”

Section: Desire Satisfactionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should contentment be a key aim in higher education?

Gibbs

2016

Educational Philosophy and Theory

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IntroductionThe notion that education is the provision of intellectual and emotional desire satisfaction has tended to become a driver of university strategy, reflecting how institutionalised education (in some, but by no means all cases) has been interpreted in this consumerist epoch. Roberts (2013) writes that education now seems actually to be about promoting desire satisfaction, often in ways that are not implicit for education but that create Should Satisfaction Be a Higher Educative Aim? The case for contentment pleasurable and measurable experiences. It is this shift of emphasis from the nature of edification which might be pleasurable to where the edifying experiences are required to be pleasures is s significant change in educational policy. Moreover, the effects of this change is compounded as what is taken as pleasurable is that which satisfies certain desired attributes of the input processes of being educated not in the more ontologically difficult notion of learning as becoming . These inputs and the level of their satisfactory delivery prove conducive to be measured and measured they must to justify the returns on the investment made in them both by the students and others in the education process. The value for money imperative has led to the fetish of unquestioned metrics which prompts simple comparisons of the complex that lead to the invasion of pedagogical policy and practice.Satisfaction metrixs are used to build reputation, inform educational policy and create conformity. Moreover, they represent an agenda for desire satisfaction that is an extravagant, imagined sea of opportunity (favoured by advocates of education as a means to an end through accreditation which increases social capital through levels of employment)and not one where a tempering of achievement is obtained through balancing capabilities and potentiality. Indeed, the current context of education seems to emphasise anxiety of failure in getting right job and income and thus fear and dissonance for one's decisions about one's future. This paper considers higher education from an alternative perceptive of contentment and tries to develop a clarity between that and happiness and desire satisfaction. Such clarity is needed as the terms are often conflated leading to confusion in practice. I seek to do this by reference to Heidegger and especially to his distinction between emotions (in my terms;happiness, joy) which are brief and transitory and moods (contentment, anxiety0 which are fundamental and reveal the world to use. These of course intermingle but are distinctive in their temporal relevance. The notion of happiness, satisfaction contentmentThe etymology of the terms shows a closeness and interrelationship between all three terms being contented, satisfied and happy. Indeed it seems that the dominate term is happiness for it can act as meaning giving in a number of ways. Indeed the literature often uses happiness as a prefix to discussing desire satisfaction and contentment. however in this paper I want to deliberately hold...

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“…There are many accounts of harm. To give just some indication of the range of possible views, on some accounts whether a person suffers harm depends on his or her selfassessment, on other accounts the judgments of the individual's community matters, on other accounts whether someone is harmed depends on objective facts as to whether he or she can flourish as a human being ideally should (for an overview see Griffin 1986). The difference between these accounts can be seen clearly if one considers what they would say about a woman who has been rendered incapable of feeling sexual pleasure via female "circumcision".…”

Section: Value-laden Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Being ill and getting better: recovery and accounts of disorder

Cooper¹

2012

Recovery of People With Mental Illness

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The aim of psychiatric treatment is to help patients to get better, but working out what getting better should be taken to mean can be problematic. This chapter explores how one's view of what counts as recovery will depend on the account of disorder that one adopts. Accounts of disorder can be split into two main categories. Biologically based accounts (paradigmatically those of Christopher Boorse) claim that disorder is purely a matter of biological dysfunctioning. According to such accounts the aim of treatment will be to restore functioning such that ultimately the patient's psychological subsystems will function in the same way as those of other humans of the same age and gender. Accordingly, whether a patient is getting better will be seen as the sort of thing that can be fairly assessed by standardized rating scales. In contrast, accounts which hold that disorder is a value-laden concept will lead one to view recovery differently. According to such accounts, for a condition to count as a disorder it must be bad. It will be argued that whether a condition is bad or not will vary with factors such as the social environment, and also with the aims, desires, and self-understanding of the individual patient. One consequence of this is that a condition that was once bad for the patient can be rendered neutral or good for them not only by altering the functioning of their psychological subsystems, but also by altering the patient's social environment or their own assessment of the situation. This means that measuring “recovery” will not be a straightforward matter. The chapter ends by considering how treatment efficacy might best be assessed according to such a view of recovery.

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Well-Being

Cited by 116 publications

References 18 publications

Does a painless death harm an invertebrate?

Does a painless death harm an invertebrate?

Should contentment be a key aim in higher education?

Being ill and getting better: recovery and accounts of disorder

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