After the global financial crisis, institutions have gradually moved from the unsecured interbank lending market to the repo markets to cover their funding needs. At the same time, while the supply of high quality liquid assets (HQLA) began to shrink with banks' reduced risk taking and window-dressing, the demand grew with the shift towards derivative clearing via central counterparties. This created interest in large-scale collateral swaps, upgrading low quality assets to fixed income HQLA in the securities lending market. These market forces and lenders' growing awareness to generate alternative income from passive assets through securities lending gave rise to a multi-trillion dollar fixed income segment in the global securities lending market. In this study, we focus on the primary and secondary market for German treasuries and discuss the negative welfare implications arising from the still nontransparent oligopolistic securities lending market. We first show that in the primary market, prime broker bidding group members may artificially inflate the prices of HQLA in search of scarce safe assets, disadvantaging long-term investors, such as pension funds and insurance firms, who have to gain access to these assets. More importantly, in examining the pricing implications in the secondary market, we show that prime brokers acting as lending agents for pension funds may exploit their information advantage, and do not fully compensate these lenders with limited bargaining power. Overall, we suggest that the artificially depressed yields for safe European sovereign bonds in combination with the inherent inefficiencies in the securities lending market have important negative welfare implications for the European pension system. Pension funds and insurance firms struggle to generate returns or alternative lending income from securities lending, while on the other hand being responsible for preserving wealth and managing retirement savings for the majority of European citizens. Our results have important policy implications. We suggest that pension funds and insurance firms need to become more proactive by either managing their own lending desk or by lobbying for more regulatory oversight and greater transparency to improve their bargaining power. From a welfare perspective, we suggest that it is inefficient to restrict pension funds to purchase treasuries in the secondary market through prime broker-dealers because this exposes them to significant direct and indirect costs, which in the end are borne by the pensioners.