Were You a Part of Your Mother?

Kingma, Elselijn

doi:10.1093/mind/fzy087

Cited by 83 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…[20] Hence, individuals that have failed to transition from fetus-function to neonatalfunction are comparable to 'detached body part [s].' [19,20] Thus, whether it is justifiable to 'dispose' of gestatelings and affected neonates raises similar questions to whether it is justifiable to dispose of one's detached body parts (e.g., gametes, blood, etc.). 10 [19] So, if gestaticide is infanticide, we are faced with two options.…”

Section: Gestaticide Is Infanticidementioning

confidence: 99%

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Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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The rapid development of artificial womb technologies means that we must consider if and when it is permissible to kill the human subject of ectogestation—recently termed a ‘gestateling’ by Elizabeth Chloe Romanis—prior to ‘birth’. We describe the act of deliberately killing the gestateling as gestaticide and argue that there are good reasons to maintain that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide, which we consider to be morally impermissible. First, we argue that gestaticide is harder to justify than abortion, primarily because the gestateling is completely independent of its biological parents. Second, we argue that gestaticide is morally equivalent to infanticide. To demonstrate this, we explain that gestatelings are born in a straightforward sense, which entails that killing them is as morally serious as infanticide. However, to strengthen our overall claim, we also show that if gestatelings are not considered to have been born, killing them is still equivalent to killing neonates with congenital anomalies and disabilities, which again is infanticide. We conclude by considering how our discussion of gestaticide has implications for the permissibility of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from gestatelings.

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Section: Gestaticide Is Infanticidementioning

confidence: 99%

“…On Kingma's account of pregnancy, gestatelings and many neonates with serious congenital anomalies would still be parts of their mothers' bodies. [19,20] Claims that neonates with serious congenital anomalies are 'detached body parts' or 'have not been born' will seem highly implausible to many people.…”

Section: Gestatelings 'Birth' and Metamorphosismentioning

confidence: 99%

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

2020

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“…Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges to the philosophy of embodied cognition. Recently, in a project on the metaphysics of pregnancy, Kingma (2019) has pulled apart two options for conceiving of the relation between fetus and maternal body. Either the fetus is merely contained within the maternal body, or it is a part of the maternal body.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Kingma finds this view metaphysically more interesting, and more in line with biological and physiological knowledge of the process of pregnancy. But even accepting it, it “remains poorly understood” how far and in what ways each of them participates in this kind of relationship ( Kingma, 2019 , p. 626).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal–Fetal Interactions

Quintero

Jaegher

2020

Front. Psychol.

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Pregnancy presents some interesting challenges for the philosophy of embodied cognition. Mother and fetus are generally considered to be passive during pregnancy, both individually and in their relation. In this paper, we use the enactive operational concepts of autonomy, agency, individuation, and participation to examine the relation between mother and fetus in utero. Based on biological, physiological, and phenomenological research, we explore the emergence of agentive capacities in embryo and fetus, as well as how maternal agency changes as pregnancy advances. We show that qualitatively different kinds of agency have their beginnings already in utero, and to what extent fetal and maternal movement modulate affectivity and individuation in pregnancy. We thus propose that mother and fetus are both agents who participate in pregnancy. Pregnancy then emerges as a relational developmental organization that anchors and holds its developing participants. We end the paper with reflections on ethical implications of this proposal, and suggestions for future research.

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“…4). Also worth mentioning in this context is the dispute regarding whether or not the developing fetus is a part of its mother (Kingma [2019]). We doubt that this issue should inform our assessment of the ethics of abortion.…”

Section: F Personal Ontologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Composition Matters

Bailey

Brenner²

2020

Can. J. of Philosophy

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Many say that ontological disputes are defective because they are unimportant or without substance. In this paper, we defend ontological disputes from the charge, with a special focus on disputes over the existence of composite objects. Disputes over the existence of composite objects, we argue, have a number of substantive implications across a variety of topics in metaphysics, science, philosophical theology, philosophy of mind, and ethics. Since the disputes over the existence of composite objects have these substantive implications, they are themselves substantive.

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Were You a Part of Your Mother?

Cited by 83 publications

References 44 publications

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Gestaticide: killing the subject of the artificial womb

Pregnant Agencies: Movement and Participation in Maternal–Fetal Interactions

Why Composition Matters

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