This paper traces the development of a particular securitisation narrative, which over-exaggerated Iranian involvement with the Houthi movement between 2014 and 2015. It is important to contextualise, as, over time, this narrative has gradually become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with Iranian involvement steadily increasing (Juneau, 2016;Shaif, 2019). During the build-up to Operation Decisive Storm (ODS), a Saudi-led air and naval campaign that consisted of comprehensive bombing and blockading, Iranian involvement with the Houthi rebels was minimal (Hill, 2017). Nevertheless, key figures from the Islamic Republic, especially within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), had raised Saudi anxiety by espousing rhetorical support for the Houthis. There was not complete consensus across the political and military classes in Iran that this was the correct course of action, but members of both the IRGC and political elite goaded Riyadh by lending rhetorical support to the Houthis. Saudi Arabia (KSA) over-exaggerated the connection between the two, portraying the Houthis as a direct Iranian proxy, to justify its intervention to international audiences, touching on pre-existing anti-Iranian sentiment. Fearful of the growing likelihood of improved United States (US)-Iranian relations through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Riyadh took small instances of Iranian influence in Yemen and amplified them to an untruthful level (Mabon, 2018). International audiences, especially the US and the United Kingdom (UK), accepted and co-opted this narrative.