What Are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping?

Berdal, Mats

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99106-1_6

Cited by 23 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…3 This understanding has resulted in a trench war between two schools of thought. 4 In one trench, you have the "robust peacekeepers" advocating that peace operation forces be equipped and mandated to threaten and use force beyond self-defence to deter aggression and protect Berdal 2019;Crawford 1998. 4 For reviews of this debate see Findlay 2003;Jakobsen 2000a. civilians.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deterrence in Peace Operations: Look Beyond the Battlefield and Expand the Number of Targets and Influence Mechanisms

Jakobsen

2020

Nl Arms

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The peace operations literature suffers from a narrow focus on battlefield deterrence. It ignores the need to deter actors beyond the battlefield from supporting the combatants using force, and analyses the use of military threats and force in peace operations in a vacuum without taking into account the other instruments that deterring actors employ simultaneously to influence the combatants, combatant allies, combatant supporters and bystanders that undermine deterrence in peace operations. Since most peace operation forces lack the capacity and willingness to threaten and use force in accordance with the requirements stipulated by rational deterrence theory, influencing actors beyond the battlefield is more important with respect to deterring violence than the military efforts undertaken by peace operation forces to deter combatants from using force or to compel them to stop doing so. Accordingly, this chapter develops a new analytical framework that will enable peace operation theorists and practitioners to target all the actors that undermine deterrence on the battlefield and beyond with all the tools at their disposal—persuasion, inducement and coercion. The framework will improve both theory and practice by providing a better understanding of the conditions under which peace operations can contribute to deterring and, if need be, compelling combatants from using force as well as identifying the tools that practitioners can employ to this end. It highlights that peace operations merely constitute the top of the deterrence iceberg, and that peace operation forces must be supported by other actors and tools to succeed with respect to deterring violence and facilitating conflict resolution.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deterrence in Peace Operations: Look Beyond the Battlefield and Expand the Number of Targets and Influence Mechanisms

Jakobsen

2020

Nl Arms

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“…However, enforcing R2P is difficult due to the veto power as a component in the voting system of the Security Council. Many look to the UN Peacekeepers as an enforcer of R2P amid conflict; however, the operational, administrative and security limitations of the UN Peacekeepers substantially impairs their response as a capable force for security stabilization in post-conflict nation-building(Berdal 2018;Gregg et al 2015;Østensen 2001; UN Department of Public Information, 1999, 2005a, b, 2018 UN General Assembly and Security Council, 2000; UN Security Council 1946; UN Office of Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.;UN Peacekeeping 2008, 2019Serafino 2007;Sheehan 2008;Siobhán, 2018;Smit 2018;Welsh 2013). 6 The international community has considered post-conflict outsourcing from UN Peacekeepers to PMCs.…”

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confidence: 99%

Limits and Possibilities of the United States Military in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization

Neto¹,

dos²

2020

Preprint

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This study probes the limits and possibilities of US military efforts to facilitate the transition from warfighting to nation-building. Most comparative studies conceive the complexity of this transition along a spectrum from conflict to humanitarian assistance to post-conflict stabilization. While the last two stages have often been interpreted as a coordinated act of civil-military ‘nation-building’; the spectrum, in fact, represents an ideal type simplification. At one level, outcomes depend on the players involved, including: sovereign nations, national militaries, international and regional institutions, UN peacekeepers, private security contractors, and non-governmental humanitarian providers, among others. On the other hand, because the number, types, and causes of case outcomes are highly diverse and contingent upon many possible factors (among them for example: political, economic, military, organizational, humanitarian, cultural, and religious), institutions like the US military face serious difficulties both planning and coordinating post-conflict scenarios. Assuming this complex backdrop, the present study offers a qualitative analysis of two recent US government reports by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) on US military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases, the US government sought to ‘nation-build’ by facilitating post-war stabilization and humanitarian assistance, detailing its genuine efforts to record both processes. While results indicate some limited successes in both cases, they also indicate a familiar pattern of uneven performance failures consistent with other cases internationally. The analysis concludes with recommendations for further research that may better control the contingencies of post-conflict management.

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Protection of Basic Human Rights by Exercising Graded Responsibilities: Linking the Responsibility to Protect with the Attribution of Extraterritorial Duties

Peters

2023

Contributions to International Relations

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What Are the Limits to the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping?

Cited by 23 publications

References 7 publications

Deterrence in Peace Operations: Look Beyond the Battlefield and Expand the Number of Targets and Influence Mechanisms

Deterrence in Peace Operations: Look Beyond the Battlefield and Expand the Number of Targets and Influence Mechanisms

Limits and Possibilities of the United States Military in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization

Protection of Basic Human Rights by Exercising Graded Responsibilities: Linking the Responsibility to Protect with the Attribution of Extraterritorial Duties

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