What can a perception-memory expert tell a jury?

Loftus, Geoffrey R.

doi:10.3758/pbr.17.2.143

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In this regard, Loftus and Harley (2005) recount the case of a witness who was 450 ft. (∼137 m) away from the perpetrator at the time of the crime but identified him at trial nonetheless. Loftus (2010) describes yet another case of a witness who was 271 ft. (∼83 m) away from the perpetrator at the time of the crime but, again, identified him at trial. Because, as they showed, it is not possible to recognize faces from these distances, it seems likely that these witnesses made their identifications based on something other than a memory match signal (e.g., perhaps because of police pressure).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of estimator variables in eyewitness identification.

Semmler¹,

Dunn²,

Mickes³

et al. 2018

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied

116

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Estimator variables are factors that can affect the accuracy of eyewitness identifications but that are outside of the control of the criminal justice system. Examples include (1) the duration of exposure to the perpetrator, (2) the passage of time between the crime and the identification (retention interval), (3) the distance between the witness and the perpetrator at the time of the crime. Suboptimal estimator variables (e.g., long distance) have long been thought to reduce the reliability of eyewitness identifications (IDs), but recent evidence suggests that this is not true of IDs made with high confidence and may or may not be true of IDs made with lower confidence. The evidence suggests that though suboptimal estimator variables decrease discriminability (i.e., the ability to distinguish innocent from guilty suspects), they do not decrease the reliability of IDs made with high confidence. Such findings are inconsistent with the longstanding "optimality hypothesis" and therefore require a new theoretical framework. Here, we propose that a signal-detection-based likelihood ratio account-which has long been a mainstay of basic theories of recognition memory-naturally accounts for these findings.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of estimator variables in eyewitness identification.

Semmler¹,

Dunn²,

Mickes³

et al. 2018

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied

116

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These include aspects of the witness, perpetrator, the crime event itself, or intervening events. For example, witnessing crimes under poor lighting conditions (G. Loftus, 2010), for a short amount of time (Bornstein, Deffenbacher, Penrod, & McGorty, 2012), from great distances (Lampinen, Erickson, Moore, & Hittson, 2014), or committed by someone of a different race (Meissner & Brigham, 2001) can greatly reduce identification accuracy. Long delays (or retention intervals) between the crime event and memory test may also weaken eyewitness memory (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, McGorty, & Penrod, 2008;Wheatcroft, Wagstaff, & Manarin, 2015) and, further, increase the risk of exposure to post-event information and suggestion (e.g., media reports and conversations with other witnesses), which may distort witnesses' recollections of their experiences (E. Loftus, 2005).…”

Section: Eyewitness Memory and Juror Evaluations Of Witness Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Sensitizing Potential Jurors to Variations in Eyewitness Evidence Quality Using Counterfactual Thinking

Rodriguez

Berry

2016

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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Jurors often have difficulty evaluating eyewitness testimony. Counterfactual thinking is a type of mental simulation that informs causal inference. Encouraging jurors to think counterfactually about eyewitness factors may sensitize them to these factors' causal influence on eyewitness identification and testimony accuracy, improving their overall judgments (such as verdicts). One hundred twenty-one undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario containing either high-quality or lowquality eyewitness evidence and to evaluate eyewitness factors adopting either their default or a counterfactual mindset via a question-order manipulation. Logistic regressions and analyses of variance revealed that a counterfactual mindset lowered perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and guilty verdicts (compared with the default mindset) when the evidence was poor; a counterfactual mindset, however, did not increase perceptions of accuracy and guilty verdicts when evidence was strong. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying these effects and identify several potential avenues for future research.

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“…For instance, system variables such as lineup composition (the selection of “filler” faces; Fitzgerald, Price, Oriet, & Charman, 2013), the “blindness” of the lineup administrator (Rodriguez & Berry, 2013), and pre‐lineup instructions (Steblay, 1997) can affect identification accuracy. Similarly, estimator variables including aspects of the crime situation (e.g., lighting; Loftus, 2010), witness and perpetrator characteristics (e.g., race; Meissner & Brigham, 2001), viewing conditions (e.g., distance; Lampinen, Erikson, Moore, & Hittson, 2014), and delay (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, McGorty, & Penrod, 2008) can also affect memory and identification accuracy (for a review, see NRC, 2014). Clearly, numerous aspects of witnessing and identification conditions are relevant when judging an eyewitness's accuracy.…”

Section: Eyewitness Evidence and Juror Evaluationsmentioning

confidence: 99%