2011 XXXth URSI General Assembly and Scientific Symposium 2011
DOI: 10.1109/ursigass.2011.6050718
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What can be learned from documented Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) attacks?

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Cited by 36 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…(6) Some real-world examples of historical occurrences of IEMI attacks are given by Sabath. (7) Since the late 1990s, the awareness of the potential threat of IEMI attacks on critical infrastructures has increased. (8) Therefore, the interest in risk analysis of IEMI on important infrastructure has risen.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…(6) Some real-world examples of historical occurrences of IEMI attacks are given by Sabath. (7) Since the late 1990s, the awareness of the potential threat of IEMI attacks on critical infrastructures has increased. (8) Therefore, the interest in risk analysis of IEMI on important infrastructure has risen.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are too few data on IEMI occurrences to accurately estimate probabilities of these events. (7) Moreover, historical data on deliberate attacks may have limited predictive value for forecasting future attacks. (12) Antagonistic attacks differ from random, nondeliberate hazards such as natural catastrophes in that they are conducted by an intelligent adversary with an objective that tries to choose points of attack such that the objective is accomplished in the most efficient manner.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even though it is of special importance that the automation and control of these infrastructures is robust against electromagnetic attacks they are strikingly often based on commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) equipment fulfilling no more than basic civil EMC specifications. Hence the need for protection against IEMI has grown radically [1], [2], [3].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent years, the threat of reducing the functionality of such infrastructures using electromagnetic fields to jam, damage, or shut down the electric and electronic systems instrumental to their good performance has become more and more effective [1], [2].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%