2021
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210521000231
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What constitutes successful covert action? Evaluating unacknowledged interventionism in foreign affairs

Abstract: Covert action has long been a controversial tool of international relations. However, there is remarkably little public understanding about whether it works and, more fundamentally, about what constitutes success in this shadowy arena of state activity. This article distills competing criteria of success and examines how covert actions become perceived as successes. We develop a conceptual model of covert action success as a social construct and illustrate it through the case of ‘the golden age of CIA operatio… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…106 In the latter cases, propaganda heavily relied on false, fabricated pieces and lies, building on secret and deceptive actions. 107 Between the two, a vast majority of propaganda contents includes appeals to known facts coupled with almost-truths, distortion, and oversimplification. 108 Propaganda, therefore, frequently conflates facts with inferences and values and lies to its recipient to achieve political and strategic goals.…”
Section: Assessment Criterion 2: Deliberate Falsehoodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…106 In the latter cases, propaganda heavily relied on false, fabricated pieces and lies, building on secret and deceptive actions. 107 Between the two, a vast majority of propaganda contents includes appeals to known facts coupled with almost-truths, distortion, and oversimplification. 108 Propaganda, therefore, frequently conflates facts with inferences and values and lies to its recipient to achieve political and strategic goals.…”
Section: Assessment Criterion 2: Deliberate Falsehoodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is a body of literature on intelligence failure (Dahl, 2013; Jervis, 2011; Rovner, 2011; Stein, 1980), which emphasizes unit-level bureaucratic politics and cognitive biases. But there is less work on intelligence success (Cormac et al, 2022; Lindsay, 2020a), which depends on system-level relationships between intelligence adversaries. The literature on military effectiveness (Biddle, 2004; Brooks and Stanley, 2007; Talmadge, 2015) offers relevant insights, namely on the importance of institutions over the quality or quantity of weapons.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%