2021
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3870196
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What Does Codetermination Do?

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Cited by 8 publications
(22 citation statements)
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References 57 publications
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“…Our causal estimates also complement existing evidence on the positive correlation between cooperation or trust within firms and productivity (see, e.g., Krueger and Mas, 2004;Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012;Hjort, 2014). We also contribute to the literature on codetermination, which studies institutions that combine worker voice with formal decision-making rights for workers, and has found some evidence for positive productivity effects (Addison, 2009;Jäger, Schoefer, and Heining, 2020;Jäger, Noy, and Schoefer, forthcoming). Our study uniquely provides quasi-experimental evidence from A separate literature cautions that increasing worker voice, to the extent that it goes along with shift in bargaining power, may instead have negative effects, e.g., by exacerbating agency conflicts or discouraging capital formation (Jensen and Meckling, 1979).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 70%
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“…Our causal estimates also complement existing evidence on the positive correlation between cooperation or trust within firms and productivity (see, e.g., Krueger and Mas, 2004;Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012;Hjort, 2014). We also contribute to the literature on codetermination, which studies institutions that combine worker voice with formal decision-making rights for workers, and has found some evidence for positive productivity effects (Addison, 2009;Jäger, Schoefer, and Heining, 2020;Jäger, Noy, and Schoefer, forthcoming). Our study uniquely provides quasi-experimental evidence from A separate literature cautions that increasing worker voice, to the extent that it goes along with shift in bargaining power, may instead have negative effects, e.g., by exacerbating agency conflicts or discouraging capital formation (Jensen and Meckling, 1979).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 70%
“…Yet, there is little causal evidence on how organizational cultures of worker voice affect firm and worker outcomes. While many countries mandate some form of worker voice (Hall and Soskice, 2001;Jäger, Noy, and Schoefer, forthcoming), these voice mandates are typically bundled with other rules-such as strong labor regulations or re-allocations of formal corporate decision-making power-making the effects of voice difficult to disentangle. As one prominent example, Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2016) estimate negative effects of a complex set of regulations kicking in at a firm size threshold in France, but primarily attribute them to firing regulations rather than the works council mandate.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These nascent corporate policies remain severely constrained in their power and independence from management, but that could change. Governments might impose a variant of Germany's requirement of worker codetermination through participation on corporate boards (Jäger et al, 2021); in this case, platforms of a certain size might need to have user-elected representatives on their boards or moderation teams.…”
Section: For Communitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We draw on surveys, interviews, and case studies to answer these questions. Finally, in Part IV, we briefly survey the existing quantitative evidence on the economic impacts of codetermination, drawing heavily on a recent survey article by Jäger, Noy, and Schoefer (2022).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%