What Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy and Cooperation Contract

Ma, Weimin; Zhang, Ranran; Chai, Shiwei

doi:10.3390/su11205584

Cited by 54 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…This assumption is justified because the results for an arbitrary γ can be obtained by scaling of the equilibrium green innovation efforts e i = γe i . Similar assumptions can be found in earlier works, such as those by Chen et al [56] and Ma et al [57]. Assumption 3.…”

Section: Assumptionssupporting

confidence: 57%

“…The symbol β represents a scenario in which green innovation activities by the manufacturer and retailer lead to an increase in the unit operation cost. For example, in the coffee industry, eco-friendly manufacturing processes increase the unit production cost by approximately 30% [56][57][58]. We also restrict our attention to β ∈ [0, 1) such that the supply chain members are assumed to make positive green innovation efforts.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

Lee

2020

IJERPH

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As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

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Section: Assumptionssupporting

confidence: 57%

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

Lee

2020

IJERPH

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“…Liu and Nishi [42] stated that government intervention could influence the market demands and return rates. Ma et al [43] studied the method to drive green innovation, and the results show that the government should subsidize both the retailer and the manufacturer to improve the green innovation level. Yang and Xiao [44] studied the role of governmental intervention in GSC under different channel power scenarios.…”

Section: Governmental Interventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Channel Structure Strategies of Supply Chains with Varying Green Cost and Governmental Interventions

2019

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Environmental concerns make enterprises pay more attention to green manufacturing. The emerging green supply chain inevitably will compete with the traditional supply chain. In order to evaluate the competitiveness of supply chains and the impact on channel structure strategy, we develop four game models for two competing supply chains according to their channel structure strategies. Green marginal manufacturing cost, demand sensitivity of green level, and governmental interventions are considered. We study how retail prices, green levels, and profits are influenced by channel structure choice and governmental interventions. Analytical results indicate that the substitutability of products affects channel structure strategy. When the substitutability of products is relatively low, centralization-centralization is the unique Nash equilibrium. However, when the substitutability of products is relatively high, both centralization-centralization and decentralization-decentralization are the Nash equilibriums. Centralization-centralization is a prisoner dilemma, while decentralization-decentralization can make the green supply chain achieve optimal profit. Then, the green marginal manufacturing cost and demand sensitivities of the green level play important but different roles in channel structure strategy of the competing supply chains. Further, whether Nash equilibriums are the optimal strategy depends on governmental intervention. Relatively severe governmental intervention might realize a relatively higher green level, but may not always achieve the lowest retail price for the green supply chain. However, a relatively moderate governmental intervention might achieve a relatively lower green level.

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“…Hence, government, industry, university, and research institutions and consumers should be closely linked. The formation of a multi-agent cooperation is of great significance to improve the mechanism of green technology innovation with manufacturing enterprises as the main body [15].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improving the Effectiveness of Multi-Agent Cooperation for Green Manufacturing in China: A Theoretical Framework to Measure the Performance of Green Technology Innovation

Yin

Zhang

2020

IJERPH

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A green manufacturing system is an important tool to realize green transformation of the manufacturing industry. The systematicness of green technology innovation as the key foundation of green manufacturing supports the entire huge green manufacturing system. In order to improve the effectiveness of multi-agent cooperation, it is necessary to analyze a series of green technology innovation achievements of manufacturing enterprises under multi-agent cooperation. First of all, inter-indicator correlation analysis and exploratory factor analysis were used to construct the evaluation index system of the green technology innovation performance of manufacturing enterprises under multi-agent cooperation. Then, a secondary combined evaluation model was constructed based on the evaluation conclusions. Finally, a theoretical framework was constructed to measure the performance of the green technology innovation of manufacturing enterprises under multi-agent cooperation. The results of this study are as follows: The evaluation index system of the green technology innovation performance of manufacturing enterprises under multi-agent cooperation is composed of the technology output, economic output, and social effect of green technology innovation. The key factors that influence the green technology innovation performance of manufacturing enterprises under multi-agent cooperation are the proportion of green technology transformation in traditional technology, the number of papers published jointly by multi-agent cooperation, the user acceptance of green technology products, and the degree of improvement of public environmental preference and consciousness. A fusion of technology of subjective and objective methods is an effective evaluation technique and can be applied to evaluate the performance of green technology innovation. The secondary combined evaluation combines the evaluation conclusions obtained by each single evaluation method in a certain form.

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What Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy and Cooperation Contract

Cited by 54 publications

References 54 publications

Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

Channel Structure Strategies of Supply Chains with Varying Green Cost and Governmental Interventions

Improving the Effectiveness of Multi-Agent Cooperation for Green Manufacturing in China: A Theoretical Framework to Measure the Performance of Green Technology Innovation

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