What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?

Abstract

It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an 'explanatory gap'-that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the conscious mind and the brain, their relationship still remains mysterious. I argue that this agreed view is quite mistaken. The feeling of a 'explanatory gap' arises only because we cannot stop ourselves thinking about the mind-brain relation in a dualist way.

The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness

“…According to the conventional view, the source of the gap is that physical/functional facts do not entail any non-trivial phenomenal facts. But I agree with Papineau (2011) that the real source of the gap is simply the psychological disposition to reject identity statements between phenomenal states and physical/functional states. The explanation for this gap is a psychological question that, in all likelihood, will eventually be answered by science.…”

Dissolving Type‐b Physicalism

“…There is simply nothing more to be said (cf. Papineau ). This raises a further challenge: Suppose that Mary* begins to contemplate the possibility of dualism.…”

Explaining What?

“…Whether this account is right or not, it points to the idea that intuitions about specific contents of consciousness or the nature of consciousness per se may well be due to features of our cognitive architecture, and in a way that does not reflect how our brains, or consciousness, actually work (see also Papineau 2011). Explaining how discrepancies arise between common intuitions or philosophical claims and brain/body functioning is important; it makes it possible to explain the way things seem in a satisfactory way while leaving the 'seemings' incapable of driving further claims.…”