What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time

Abstract

Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist's claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For what exactly is an experience of temporal passage? One natural thought is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing change, or in virtue of experiencing change as 'dynamic'. Another is that we experience passage in virtue of experiencing events as (successively) present. None of these experiences, I argue, amounts to an experience of passage. Although there might still be other ways to experience passage, A-theorists would have to provide us with a plausible candidate experience. If there is such an experience at all, it won't be one that qualifies as what we intuitively take to be an experience of passage. The 'intuitive advantage', it seems, has dissolved in any case.

String theory, loop quantum gravity and eternalism

“…This denial of the partial ordering of events in LQG, and of duration in ST, is more radical than what we usually find in the recent philosophy literature. Indeed, in the metaphysical and phenomenological literature, it is quite common to argue that time does not flow (the quite standard B-theory), and that the notion of flow corresponds to a perceptual or linguistic artifact (see for instance Paul 2010, Frischhut 2015and Benovsky 2015. Also, it is sometimes argued that time does not own an intrinsic direction (the C-theory according to which the temporal dimension is only made of non-orientated relations).…”

Presentism and Temporal Experience

“…21 Realism is defended among others by Foster (1982), Dainton (2000), Le Poidevin (2007), Phillips (2010); antirealism among others by Chuard (2011) and Dennett (1991). 22 Exceptions are Prosser (2007), Frischhut (2013) and Hoerl (2014), who have argued against this assumption. 23 A static form of presentism is, though deeply implausible, not incoherent.…”

“…First, it is not at all obvious that we actually have experiences of temporal passage (see note 23). For more discussion on this point, see Prosser (2007), Deng (2013a), Frischhut (2013) and Hoerl (2014). Second, one might wonder whether presentism has the tools to account for any form of objective temporal passage.…”

On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death

“…(Incidentally, it's not clear to me that B-theorists should claim any of this (for contrary views, see e.g. Savitt 2002, Oaklander 2012, Leininger 2013, Deng 2013, Mozersky 2015, Frischhut 2013, Hoerl 2014. But many B-theorists do, and that version of the B-theory is widely endorsed.…”