2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.002
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What Explains Collective Action in the Commons? Theory and Evidence from the Philippines

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Cited by 173 publications
(157 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
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“…maximization welfare at least adaptation cost; (5) reliable enforcement mechanisms; and (6) a polycentric structure of governance. These findings are consistent with the literature on successful and long enduring collective action in the commons (Araral, 2009(Araral, , 2011Ostrom, 1990). Finally, these institutional design principles would have significant theoretical, practical and research implications for adaptation particularly for water resource management in a river basin context.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 92%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…maximization welfare at least adaptation cost; (5) reliable enforcement mechanisms; and (6) a polycentric structure of governance. These findings are consistent with the literature on successful and long enduring collective action in the commons (Araral, 2009(Araral, , 2011Ostrom, 1990). Finally, these institutional design principles would have significant theoretical, practical and research implications for adaptation particularly for water resource management in a river basin context.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 92%
“…Some scholars, for example Agrawal (2002), Wade (1989), Ostrom (1990), Baland and Plateau (1996), Ribot (2002), Araral (2009) have identified at least 20 factors they suggest could facilitate collective action in the commons. While this is a useful starting point, there is scant research that links this corpus of knowledge to the climate adaptation literature.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, agricultural 565 and industrial inputs reduce water quality in the estuary, yet they cannot be regulated by the 566 government department mandated to manage public water resources and there is nosystems were found to work more effectively when compliance was controlled by the farmers 569 themselves rather than by the government (Araral 2009). However, such situations are likely 570 influenced by the social networks of the farmers including the widespread integration of 571 infrastructure providers within the community of irrigators (Anderies et al 2004).…”
Section: Modelling Scenarios 317mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By collective identity, we refer to the shared meanings, experiences and expectations that direct the behaviors of resource users and differentiate a group of users -in other words the collective -from other similar social units (Araral 2009). Collective identity can be characterized as an outcome of dynamic relational processes that are evinced in collective action situations.…”
Section: Collective Identitymentioning
confidence: 99%