2015
DOI: 10.1086/684228
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
24
0

Year Published

2018
2018
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
7
1

Relationship

2
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 19 publications
(24 citation statements)
references
References 51 publications
0
24
0
Order By: Relevance
“…When a country is close to default, contract terms that make it more (or less) likely that holdouts will be able to block a restructuring for the specific bond can provide substantial positive (or negative) value to the holders of that specifc bond. As described earlier, the large and disproportionate recoveries that holdout specialists have obtained via the exercise of contract terms in the recent restructurings of Argentina and Greece are vivid examples of this -something that the broader data bears out (Schumacher, Trebesch & Enderlein 2015& 2018a.…”
Section: Republic Bonds I the Pricing Of Cacs Near Defaultmentioning
confidence: 90%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…When a country is close to default, contract terms that make it more (or less) likely that holdouts will be able to block a restructuring for the specific bond can provide substantial positive (or negative) value to the holders of that specifc bond. As described earlier, the large and disproportionate recoveries that holdout specialists have obtained via the exercise of contract terms in the recent restructurings of Argentina and Greece are vivid examples of this -something that the broader data bears out (Schumacher, Trebesch & Enderlein 2015& 2018a.…”
Section: Republic Bonds I the Pricing Of Cacs Near Defaultmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…Hence, scholars examining the question of sovereigns' inclinations toward default could put aside the risk of legal enforcement as a consideration (e.g., Aguiar & Amador 2014). This changed in the mid 1970s when the leading jurisdictions issuing sovereign bonds, the US and the UK, passed sovereign immunity laws that allowed sovereigns acting in a commercial capacity to be sued in the same fashion as other commercial actors (Schumacher, Trebesch & Enderlein 2015& 2018a. Today, as the successes of holdout creditors in the restructurings of Argentina…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Litigation fails with probability 1 − φ, in which case the holdout creditor receives nothing. Following Schumacher et al (2015), φ can be interpreted as a measure of the strength of creditor rights. Holdouts are costly for the economy and reduce output by the fraction f (µ) ∈ [0, η], where µ is the ratio of holdout creditors to all bondholders.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our work is related to the literature on creditor litigation in sovereign debt, notably Haldane, Penalver, Saporta, and Shin (2005), Engelen and Lambsdorff (2009), Pitchford and Wright (2012), Bai and Zhang (2012), and Schumacher, Trebisch, and Enderlein (2015). But these papers focus on the ex post renegotiation stage rather than the ex ante implications for sovereign borrowing and the design of the bankruptcy framework.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The same argument applies to sovereign debt or contractual disputes even though they are often initiated by a wider and more dispersed group of claimants. 102 It is inevitable that, in these situations, creditors will look to international courts as a way to bypass the limitations of domestic law.…”
Section: The Need For Increased Legal Protectionmentioning
confidence: 99%