What is a cognitive ontology, anyway?

Janssen, A. H.; Klein, Colin; Slors, M.V.P.

doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1312496

Cited by 19 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The broader point is about cognitive ontology. In the sense we mean here, a cognitive ontology is a set of standardized terms which refer to the entities postulated by a cognitive theory ( Janssen et al, 2017 ). The point of developing a cognitive ontology is to represent the structure of psychological processes and facilitate communication through a shared taxonomy.…”

Section: Naturalized Epistemology Of Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

Khalifa

Islam²,

Gamboa

et al. 2022

Front. Syst. Neurosci.

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We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

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Section: Naturalized Epistemology Of Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

Khalifa

Islam²,

Gamboa

et al. 2022

Front. Syst. Neurosci.

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“…Tomasello has neither contested nor endorsed the idea that cumulative culture can occur via a Darwinian process. (Janssen, Klein & Slors 2017); they categorise cognitive processes in different ways. For example, Heyes's use of 'metacognition' comes from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience where, drawing on the computer metaphor that dominates those disciplines, it refers to assessment by a cognitive system of that system's own states and processes.…”

Section: Conceptual Apparatusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Henrich, Heyes and Tomasello on the cognitive foundations of cultural evolution

Heyes¹,

Moore²

2021

Preprint

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We give a brief overview of three accounts of the cognitive abilities that facilitated the emergence and transmission of cumulative culture in the recent hominin lineage. These accounts were developed by Joseph Henrich (e.g. 2016), Cecilia Heyes (e.g. 2018), and Michael Tomasello (e.g. 1999, 2008, 2014) in collaboration with others. We pay particular attention to the different abilities that these authors think are foundational to human cultural evolution, and to questions about whether these abilities first arose as products of genetic or cultural evolution. Our hope is that by clarifying the similarities and differences between these projects, we will identify points of disagreement that could tested empirically, and areas where further conceptual clarification is required.

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“…These questions bear similarity to the cognitive ontology debate (Bluhm, ; Janssen, Klein, & Slors, ; Poldrack & Yarkoni, ); yet while that debate focuses on cognitive processes such as working memory that can be isolated through use of specific experimental tasks, such a task‐based approach has limited applicability to sleep‐related experiences (Bernardi & Siclari, ). Establishing a framework for sleep‐related experiences including sleep stages is part of what we might call a conscious state ontology and raises methodological challenges of its own.…”

Section: Future Challenges and Perspectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness

Windt

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Sleep is phenomenologically rich, teeming with different kinds of conscious thought and experience. Dreaming is the most prominent example, but there is more to conscious experience in sleep than dreaming. Especially in non‐rapid eye movement sleep, conscious experience, sometimes dreamful, sometimes dreamless, also alternates with a loss of consciousness. Yet while dreaming has become established as a topic for interdisciplinary consciousness science and empirically informed philosophy of mind, the same is not true of other kinds of sleep‐related experience, nor is it true of sleep itself. I argue that this is a mistake. Conscious experience in sleep is more diverse than dreaming and we need to explain its different forms as well as the alternation between conscious and unconscious sleep states. We also need to ask how different kinds of sleep‐related experience relate to foundational issues about sleep and wakefulness as well as sleep stages. I survey recent findings and theoretical developments from sleep and dream research to show how the traditional view of sleep and its relation to wakefulness and consciousness is flawed. I then suggest that by refining our frameworks of sleep‐related experiences and sleep staging in tandem, we can work toward a better view. As we are only beginning to understand the diversity of consciousness in sleep, an important aim is programmatic: We need a philosophy of sleep and of consciousness in sleep, not just a philosophy of dreaming, and a future theory of sleep needs to integrate phenomenological considerations with neuroscientific and behavioral evidence. Working toward such a theory will radically transform our understanding of sleep, wakefulness, and our conscious minds.

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What is a cognitive ontology, anyway?

Abstract: This special issue brings together philosophical perspectives on the debate over cognitive ontology. We contextualize the papers in this issue by considering several different senses of the term "cognitive ontology" and linking those debates to traditional debates in philosophy of mind.

Cited by 19 publications

References 18 publications

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

Henrich, Heyes and Tomasello on the cognitive foundations of cultural evolution

Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness

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