What Is a de Minimis Risk?

Peterson, Martin

doi:10.1057/palgrave.rm.8240118

Cited by 62 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…5 These benefits may of course include compensations from the company (Hansson and Peterson, 2001). 6 For an overview of de minimis arguments, see Peterson (2002). 7 For appraisals of this technique, see Hansson (1993) and Hansson (2001).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighing Risks and Benefits

Hansson

2004

Topoi

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It is almost universally acknowledged that risks have to be weighed against benefits, but there are different ways to perform the weighing. In conventional risk analysis, collectivist risk-weighing is the standard. This means that an option is accepted if the sum of all individual benefits outweighs the sum of all individual risks. In practices originating in clinical medicine, such as ethical appraisals of clinical trials, individualist risk-weighing is the standard. This implies a much stricter criterion for risk acceptance, namely that the risk to which each individual is exposed should be outweighed by benefits for that same individual. The different choices of riskweighing methods in different policy areas seem to have emerged from traditional thought patterns and social relations, rather than from explicit deliberations on possible justifications for the alternative ways to weigh risks against benefits. It is not obvious how the prevalent differences in risk-weighing practices can be reconstructed in terms of consistent underlying principles of preventive health or social priority-setting.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighing Risks and Benefits

Hansson

2004

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“…However, since the amount is so small the court should apply 29 The claim that a reasonable version of the precautionary principle has to be combined with the de minimis principle is defended by e.g. Peterson (2002), Sandin (2004:21), Clarke (2005), Steele (2006), Ashford (2007), and Zander (2010:72) . 30 Munthe (2011: 24).…”

Section: In His Recent Book the Price Of Precaution And The Ethics Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The dilemma could be stated in a purely qualitative vocabulary (by using terms such as "highly unlikely" and "almost certain") but in what follows we will state it in a probabilistic vocabulary, mainly because this makes it easier to follow the argument. In order to bring out the first horn of the dilemma, consider the suggestion that the correct 32 See Whipple (1987) and Peterson (2002).…”

Section: In His Recent Book the Price Of Precaution And The Ethics Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

Carter

Peterson

2014

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“…I thank an an'onymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention. 3 Among the authors listed as supporters of this claim by C&P are Peterson (2002), Sandin (2004: 21), Clarke (2005), Steele (2006), Ashford (2007), and Zander (2010: 72). which tells us how reliable or certain the estimate of the first-order probability is.…”

Section: The Second Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Two Puzzles Resolved

Steglich‐Petersen

2014

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Abstract:In a recent paper in this journal (forthcoming), Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of the familiar but conceptually harmless challenge of adjudicating between relevant interests to reach assessments of threats when applying the precautionary principle. The second puzzle can be shown to rely on a subtle but crucial misrepresentation of the relevant probabilities at play when applying the precautionary principle.

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What Is a de Minimis Risk?

Cited by 62 publications

References 14 publications

Weighing Risks and Benefits

Weighing Risks and Benefits

On the Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle

The Epistemology of the Precautionary Principle: Two Puzzles Resolved

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