2017
DOI: 10.1093/philmat/nkw032
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What is a Higher-Level Set?

Abstract: Structuralist foundations of mathematics aim for an "invariant" conception of mathematics. But what should be their basic objects? Two leading answers emerge: higher groupoids or higher categories. In this paper I argue in favor of the former over the latter. First, I explain why to pick between them we need to ask the question of what is the correct "categorified" version of a set. Second, I argue in favor of groupoids over categories as "categorified" sets by introducing a pre-formal understanding of groupoi… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
(59 reference statements)
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“…We could say that constructive abstraction 'forgets' inessential information in a controlled manner, that is, in such a way that the abstraction data can be fully recovered from (or faithfully encoded in) the abstracta. 26 From a philosophical perspective, some authors-notably Awodey [20] and Tsementzis [8,73]-have analysed UF in the light provided by a family of interrelated trends in philosophy of mathematics enveloped by the term mathematical structuralism (and mainly developed, in its different eliminativist and non-eliminativist variants, by Bourbaki, Benacerraf, Putnam, Resnik, Shapiro, Hellman and Parsons among others; see [74] and references therein). The idiosyncratic presentation of UF that we have proposed here is intended to consider UF from the standpoint provided by an alternative (and maybe complementary 27 ) conceptual framework that stresses above all the constructivist elan of UF.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…We could say that constructive abstraction 'forgets' inessential information in a controlled manner, that is, in such a way that the abstraction data can be fully recovered from (or faithfully encoded in) the abstracta. 26 From a philosophical perspective, some authors-notably Awodey [20] and Tsementzis [8,73]-have analysed UF in the light provided by a family of interrelated trends in philosophy of mathematics enveloped by the term mathematical structuralism (and mainly developed, in its different eliminativist and non-eliminativist variants, by Bourbaki, Benacerraf, Putnam, Resnik, Shapiro, Hellman and Parsons among others; see [74] and references therein). The idiosyncratic presentation of UF that we have proposed here is intended to consider UF from the standpoint provided by an alternative (and maybe complementary 27 ) conceptual framework that stresses above all the constructivist elan of UF.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, and differently from a mere proposition, a proposition might have different inequivalent proofs. 8 Given two proofs p, q : a = X b of the fact that a and b are equal (that is, two identifications between a and b), we can use the fact that a = X b is itself a type to iterate the formation of equality types. This means that we can form the higher equality type p = (a= X b) q, which might or not be inhabited.…”
Section: The Intensional Treatment Of Mathematical Equalitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For some of the earlier writing that led to the ideas for UF see [35][36][37]. For a discussion of the sense in which UF is a foundation of mathematics and connections to mathematical structuralism, see [4,32,33]. For some philosophical issues associated to HoTT see [11,12,19,28].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%