What is consciousness for?

Frith, Christopher D.

doi:10.1075/pc.18.3.03fri

Cited by 26 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Yet, this experience seems to be largely post hoc and has little to do with actual control. We believe that the value of this experience arises because we can discuss the sources of our actions with others (Frith 2010). People readily explain and justify their decisions, even though these explanations and justifications may be inaccurate and self-serving.…”

Section: Reflective Discussion Of Action Changes Behaviormentioning

confidence: 97%

Mechanisms of Social Cognition

Frith

2012

Annu. Rev. Psychol.

738

542

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Social animals including humans share a range of social mechanisms that are automatic and implicit and enable learning by observation. Learning from others includes imitation of actions and mirroring of emotions. Learning about others, such as their group membership and reputation, is crucial for social interactions that depend on trust. For accurate prediction of others' changeable dispositions, mentalizing is required, i.e., tracking of intentions, desires, and beliefs. Implicit mentalizing is present in infants less than one year old as well as in some nonhuman species. Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. Meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests collide. We suggest that they also underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents, as in reflective discussion and teaching. These are key in increasing the accuracy of the models of the world that we construct.

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Section: Reflective Discussion Of Action Changes Behaviormentioning

confidence: 97%

Mechanisms of Social Cognition

Frith

2012

Annu. Rev. Psychol.

738

542

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“…The dynamics of language learning are inextricably linked to the dynamics of consciousness, in neural activity and in the social world as well (Frith & Frith, ). Consciousness is co‐constructed in social interaction (N. Ellis, ; Frith, ). In these ways the input to associative learning is socially gated (Kuhl, ).…”

Section: Non‐cartesian Cognitive Science and The 4esmentioning

confidence: 99%

Essentials of a Theory of Language Cognition

Ellis

2019

The Modern Language Journal

196

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Cognition is not just ‘in the head’; it extends well beyond the skull and the skin. Non‐Cartesian Cognitive Science views cognition as being embodied, environmentally embedded, enacted, encultured, and socially distributed. The Douglas Fir Group (2016) likewise recognizes languages as emergent, social, integrated phenomena. Language is the quintessence of distributed cognition. Language cognition is shared across naturally occurring, culturally constituted, communicative activities. Usage affects learning and it affects languages, too. These are essential components of a theory of language cognition. This article summarizes these developments within cognitive science before considering implications for language research and teaching, especially as these concern usage‐based language learning and cognition in second language and multilingual contexts. Here, I prioritize research involving corpus‐, computational‐, and psycho‐linguistics, and cognitive psychological, complex adaptive system, and network science investigations of learner–language interactions. But there are many other implications. Looking at languages through any one single lens does not do the phenomena justice. Taking the social turn does not entail restricting our research focus to the social. Nor does it obviate more traditional approaches to second language acquisition. Instead it calls for greater transdisciplinarity, diversity, and collaborative work.

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“…Because many mental processes occur without conscious awareness, it is natural to look for some utility of conscious awareness by seeing which mental processes are invariably accompanied by such awareness [87]. But that is not sufficient.…”

Section: Function Content and Psychological Ascentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Frith [87] has also developed a challenging view on which conscious awareness has a distinctively social utility that derives from the conscious awareness of one's own and others' agency. Conscious awareness of our own agency and that of others, he urges, enhances social cooperation.…”

Section: Function Content and Psychological Ascentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

Rosenthal

2012

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious.

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What is consciousness for?

Cited by 26 publications

References 55 publications

Mechanisms of Social Cognition

Mechanisms of Social Cognition

Essentials of a Theory of Language Cognition

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

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