What is nonconceptualism in Kant’s philosophy?

Pereira, Roberto Horácio de Sá

doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9851-x

Cited by 21 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 5 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“… This position, which I here oppose, is hinted at among others by Hanna (), Allais (), Grüne (), and De Sá Pereira (). To be abundantly clear: I am not suggesting here that for Kant every perception has to involve an act of judgment through which the particular is subsumed under the general rule.…”

supporting

confidence: 48%

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Mazijk¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant's first Critique and Husserl's later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have nonconceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant's philosophy, I turn to Husserl's later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception.

show abstract

supporting

confidence: 48%

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Mazijk¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Meier, Reimarus and Kant on Animal Minds

Browning

2021

Kantian rev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 ‘False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with Reimarus, Kant distinguishes himself from both Meier and Reimarus on the role of judgement in human consciousness.

show abstract

Seeing More

Matherne

2024

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The book defends a systematic interpretation of the philosopher Immanuel Kant’s theory of imagination. To this end, it offers an account of what kind of mental capacity Kant takes imagination to be in general, as well as an account of the way in which we use this capacity in theoretical, aesthetic, and practical contexts. In contrast with more traditional theories of imagination, as a kind of fantasy that we exercise only in relation to objects that are not real or not present, it proposes that Kant theorizes imagination as something that we exercise just as much in relation to objects that are real and present. It thus attributes to Kant a view of imagining as something that pervades our lives. In order to bring out this pervasiveness, it explores Kant’s account of how we exercise our imagination in perception, ordinary experience, the appreciation of beauty and sublimity, the production of art, the pursuit of happiness, and the pursuit of morality. However, it also makes the case that Kant’s analysis of this wide range of phenomena is underwritten by a unified theory of what imagination is as a remarkably flexible cognitive capacity that we can exercise in constrained and creative, playful and serious ways.

show abstract

What is nonconceptualism in Kant’s philosophy?

Cited by 21 publications

References 5 publications

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

Meier, Reimarus and Kant on Animal Minds

Seeing More

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About