What is special about indexical attitudes?

Valente, Matheus

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2017.1402701

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…For the rest of this section, I am going to consider two possible critiques of Cappelen and Dever's strategy. The first objection is from Valente (2018), which I do not think is strong enough. Valente (2018) rejects the plausibility of (iv').…”

Section: Cappelen and Dever's Strategymentioning

confidence: 97%

“…The first objection is from Valente (2018), which I do not think is strong enough. Valente (2018) rejects the plausibility of (iv'). According to him, we should interpret (iv') as saying that Ann's action that is explained by the fact that Ann holds B 0 , B 1 and D is an agent-specific action.…”

Section: Cappelen and Dever's Strategymentioning

confidence: 97%

“…This would undermine the plausibility of Explanation itself. To see this point, consider the following case adapted from a case discussed by Valente (2018): Nora Case. Ella believes that Nora is in danger and that if someone calls the police, Nora will be saved.…”

Section: Cappelen and Dever's Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Attitudes and action: againstde seexceptionalism

Lin

2022

Inquiry

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De se exceptionalism is the view that de se attitudes pose a distinctive problem for traditional theories of propositional attitudes. A recent argument for de se exceptionalism attempts to prove that the distinctive problem of de se attitudes has something to do with the role of de se attitudes in explaining actions. The argument is based on a case where two subjects seem to believe and desire all the same propositions but perform different actions. This is the most promising argument for de se exceptionalism in the current literature. This paper rejects the argument by proposing a novel model of action explanation, according to which agents perform what they consider to be the best actions. I will argue that the case, based on which the recent argument for de se exceptionalism is developed, is philosophically interesting. Traditional theories of propositional attitudes can accommodate the case easily. I will conclude that de se exceptionalism should be rejected.

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Section: Cappelen and Dever's Strategymentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Cappelen and Dever's Strategymentioning

confidence: 97%

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Attitudes and action: againstde seexceptionalism

Lin

2022

Inquiry

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given how much has been written on the special character of indexical concepts, especially regarding how hard it is to characterize sameness of thought with them, this move is not at all implausible (see, e.g.,Ninan, 2016;Valente, 2018). 21 This would be a conception of (dis)agreement that does not depend on sameness of extension, but only on sameness of rule.…”

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confidence: 99%

Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism

Valente

2019

Theoria

Self Cite

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I suggest a solution to a conflict between semantic internalism – according to which the concepts one expresses are determined by one's use of representations – and publicity – according to which, if two subjects successfully communicate or are in genuine agreement, then they entertain thoughts constituted by the same concepts. My solution rests on the thesis that there can be successful communication and genuine agreement between thinkers employing distinct concepts as long as there is a certain relation (of conceptually guaranteed sameness of extension) between them. In section 2, I motivate semantic internalism and show how it conflicts with publicity. In section 3, I carve the logical space of possible solutions to the conflict into liberal and conservative solutions. Section 4 assesses Wikforss's conservative solution to Burge's arthritis thought‐experiment and concludes that it fails for more than one reason. Section 5 introduces a new case study involving a deferential concept. This case serves as the backdrop for my positive account offered in section 6. The conclusion of the article is preceded by a comparison of my view with another recently proposed by Recanati (section 7) and some replies to possible objections (section 8).

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De sepuzzles and Frege puzzles

Torre

Weber

2019

Inquiry

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What is the relationship between Frege's puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege's puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Frege's puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended.

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What is special about indexical attitudes?

Cited by 4 publications

References 12 publications

Attitudes and action: againstde seexceptionalism

Attitudes and action: againstde seexceptionalism

Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism

De sepuzzles and Frege puzzles

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