“…Since Plato, many philosophers have held that properties and relations are universals … If my billiard ball is red, that is because redness (the universal) ‘inheres’ in the ball (the particular). (Garrett : 38, italics added)[W]hat makes a square thing square? For the realist about universals if something is square, this is in virtue of the thing instantiating the universal squareness.…”
Section: Realism and Its Attendant Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since Plato, many philosophers have held that properties and relations are universals … If my billiard ball is red, that is because redness (the universal) ‘inheres’ in the ball (the particular). (Garrett : 38, italics added)…”
Section: Realism and Its Attendant Choicementioning
Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that (i) Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that (ii) Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some concerns one might have about the view defended. I close by showing that analogous views regarding the truth of propositions (that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p) and the existence of facts (that if the fact that p exists, then it exists because p) are supported by analogs of one of these arguments.
“…Since Plato, many philosophers have held that properties and relations are universals … If my billiard ball is red, that is because redness (the universal) ‘inheres’ in the ball (the particular). (Garrett : 38, italics added)[W]hat makes a square thing square? For the realist about universals if something is square, this is in virtue of the thing instantiating the universal squareness.…”
Section: Realism and Its Attendant Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Since Plato, many philosophers have held that properties and relations are universals … If my billiard ball is red, that is because redness (the universal) ‘inheres’ in the ball (the particular). (Garrett : 38, italics added)…”
Section: Realism and Its Attendant Choicementioning
Realists about universals face a question about grounding. Are things how they are because they instantiate the universals they do? Or do they instantiate those universals because they are how they are? Take Ebenezer Scrooge. You can say that (i) Scrooge is greedy because he instantiates greediness, or you can say that (ii) Scrooge instantiates greediness because he is greedy. I argue that there is reason to prefer the latter to the former. I develop two arguments for the view. I also respond to some concerns one might have about the view defended. I close by showing that analogous views regarding the truth of propositions (that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p) and the existence of facts (that if the fact that p exists, then it exists because p) are supported by analogs of one of these arguments.
“…A concepção de realidade considerada problemática aqui e, portanto, que será alvo de críticas, é justamente a concepção defendida por essencialistas. De acordo com Garrett (2011), "essencialismo é a visão metafísica, que se origina com Aristóteles, segundo a qual os objetos e os tipos naturais têm certas propriedades que são essenciais e outras que são acidentais" (p. 39). Dessa forma, Sócrates, por exemplo, seria essencialmente um humano, mas acidentalmente calvo, assim como os tigres (e até mesmo os ligres) seriam essencialmente animais, mas acidentalmente listrados.…”
Section: Essencialismounclassified
“…Quando se imagina o conhecimento humano e o mundo separados dessa forma, qualquer vestígio de uma interpretação ou preocupação humana deve ser removido do lado do mundo para podermos obter a verdade. (Alcoff, 2001, p. 162) O critério de verdade, de acordo com essa concepção descrita, seria a de haver uma correta correspondência entre mundo e representação (a chamada "verdade por correspondência", como afirma Garrett [2011]). Segundo essa visão representacionalista, teríamos como meta procurar ideias, pensamentos ou descrições, a nível subjetivo, sobre aquilo, a nível objetivo, a que essas ideias pensamentos e descrições se referem.…”
Section: Os Conceitos De Verdade E De Fusão De Horizontesunclassified
Florsheim, D. B. (2019). On the difficulty of dialogue in psychopathology: contributions from philosophical hermeneutics and sociocultural psychology. (Doctoral thesis).
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