What kind of goods are plant genetic resources for food and agriculture? Towards the identification and development of a new global commons

Abstract

Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) were once widely considered to be global public goods. Recently, however, access to subsets of PGRFA has been subject to various forms of exclusive technological and legal restrictions. In reaction, numerous voluntary pooling initiatives -from local to global scales -are being experimented with, in an attempt to re-strike a balance more supportive of agricultural research and development. The first part of the paper argues that different subsets of PGRFA can now be accurately described as public goods, private goods, club goods and common pool resources, but that these categories do not fully interrogate important 'exogenous variables' concerning PGRFA. As the products of complex interactions between crops breeding systems and natural and human selection, PGRFA occupy a middle ground between natural resources and human-make cultural resources. The paper identifies which subsets of PGRFA are (or could be) included in an evolving global plant genetic resources commons. The paper uses Elinor Ostrom's eight design principles for long enduring commons to analyze the extent to which the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) supports this evolving global commons. The paper concludes by identifying options for policy reforms to provide better tailored institutional support for the plant genetic resources commons.

Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture: opportunities and challenges emerging from the science and information technology revolution

“…Genetic resources for food and agriculture lie somewhere between cultural and natural resources commons (Halewood, ). The original raw materials were naturally occurring plants; they have since been dramatically altered over the course of millennia through combinations of both natural and human selection pressures.…”

“…It involved farmers in centres of genetic diversity; public and private sector researchers and plant breeders; and community, national and international gene banks, with the Svalbard Global Seed Vault as the ‘safety back‐up of last resort’. Halewood's () observation that, ‘given this complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that the modular organization of PGRFA commons have evolved into separate tiers, involving like‐minded and like‐situated […] communities of actors, with various levels of connection between them’ highlights the pervasive tendency toward homophily within social networks. That is, the infrastructure for the conservation and production of PGRFA integrates and rewards some tiers better than others.…”

Against the grain? A historical institutional analysis of access governance of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in Ethiopia

“…Earlier studies have found that restrictive practices on access to PGRFA emerged following the adoption in 1992 of CBD, which recognizes sovereign rights to PGRFA (Falcon & Fowler, 2002; Halewood, 2013; Roa‐Rodríguez & Dooren, 2008). Although Ethiopia began introducing legislation to restrict access to genetic resources following CBD (from 1993), our historical analysis of Ethiopia's PGRFA governance shows that the shift toward an hyperownership approach began as early as the late 1970s.…”

“…Contracting parties to the ITPGRFA designed the current MLS in response to these new commons features of PGRFA. The MLS is based on a recognition of countries' sovereign rights over their respective PGRFA, in harmony with the CBD, but through the MLS countries have used this sovereign right to pool and share PGRFA held in their jurisdictions (Halewood, 2013). In an institutional analysis of Ethiopia's access governance, we draw in particular on two concepts from this literature: the distinction between a “new commons” approach and a “hyperownership” approach to PGRFA governance, and the concept of design issues.…”

In situ conservation—harnessing natural and human‐derived evolutionary forces to ensure future crop adaptation

“…At the same time though, this is also a strength as it increases the probability that at least some participants will remain involved in the long run. There are important policy barriers that may limit the viability of these mechanisms, particularly increasing local and global restrictions on access to seeds and germplasm (Gepts, ; Halewood, ; Louafi, Bazile, & Noyer, ; Louafi & Schloen, ). Local constraints often reflect national policies that favor the recognition of uniform, scientifically bred varieties over more heterogeneous, variable landraces; global constraints result from countries asserting sovereignty over plant genetic resources found within their national boundaries (Halewood, ; Louafi & Schloen, ; Moore & Hawtin, ).…”