Major powers have long used cultural institutes to enhance their appeal in foreign countries. As aspirant powers, Russia and China have recently launched cultural institutes of their own with the aim of improving their international reputations. However, the location and operations of the Confucius Institutes and Russkiy Mir Institutes often seem to run counter to these aims. Drawing on policy diffusion theory (PDT), we argue that these choices are less the product of strategic calculation than of policy emulation and decoupling. Using a mixed methods approach, we show that, while the Confucius Institutes and Russkiy Mir Institutes were modelled after their Western counterparts (emulation), China and Russia have operated their institutes in ways that go against the principles of cultural diplomacy (decoupling). An analysis of field research on these institutes suggests more overall decoupling with Confucius Institutes than with Russkiy Mir Institutes, which might help account for the relatively greater backlash against the Confucius Institutes in their host countries. MORE THAN A DECADE AGO, THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE governments launched parallel campaigns of cultural diplomacy to increase their appeal abroad. As aspirant great powers, both states marketed their distinctive brands through state-sponsored cultural institutes and other government organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs). Besides sponsoring international media activities, publications, exchanges and sports events, Beijing introduced cultural institutes in 2004, named after the Chinese philosopher, Confucius. Confucius Institutes are established in partnership with educational institutes in foreign countries using a cost-sharing scheme to provide language and cultural instruction