What Moore's Paradox Is About

Almeida, Cláudio de

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00040.x

Cited by 28 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Claudio de Almeida (: 41) rejects Williams’ proposal on the grounds that one can rationally believe necessary falsehoods. His example is believing the negation of the Lowenheim‐Skolem theorem on the basis of misleading testimony from experts in logic.…”

Section: Moore's Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox

Smithies

2016

Philosophical Issues

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How do we know what we believe? Gilbert Ryle is often credited with the view that we know what we believe in much the same way that we know what others believe: namely, by inference from observation of behavior. This Rylean view cannot explain all of our self-knowledge, however, since we can know what we believe even when our beliefs make no relevant causal impact on our behavior. 1In opposition to this Rylean view, I will assume that there is an epistemic asymmetry to be drawn between first-personal and third-personal ways of knowing what we believe. Each of us has some way of knowing what we ourselves believe that is peculiar in the sense that it is different from any of our ways of knowing what others believe. What is more, I will argue, this first-personal way of knowing what we believe is privileged in the sense that it is immune from the rational uncertainty and error that affects our ways of knowing what others believe. 2What is this first-personal way of knowing what we believe? A preliminary answer is that we know what we believe by introspection. However, the term 'introspection' is nothing more than a placeholder for an account of how we know what we believe. We certainly cannot assume that our knowledge of what we believe has its source in anything like inner perception. So the task remains for a theory of introspection to fill in this placeholder by giving an informative account of our first-personal way of knowing what we believe.The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we experience. 3 In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience C 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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Section: Moore's Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox

Smithies

2016

Philosophical Issues

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“…How does the principle C-P 2 work? For showing a concrete example of its functioning, let us consider George Moore's epistemic paradox (Almeida 2001;Cholbi 2009;Green and Williams 2007;Heal 1994;Lobovikov 2014b). To do this, we need some additional moral-evaluation-functions to be introduced and defined by the below glossaries and tables.…”

Section: An Equivalence Of Moore's Paradox and Gödel's Incompletenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Equivalence of Moore’s Paradox and Gödel’s Incompleteness Sentence in Two-Valued Algebra of Formal Ethics

Лобовиков¹

2016

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The paper submits surprising results of systematical investigating a formal-ethical aspect of conjoining Wittgenstein's, Moore's, Parmenides', Gödel's, and Łukasiewicz's ideas. A critique of Wittgenstein's critique of the natural language of ethics and of metaphysics results in submitting and elaborating a new paradigm of metaphysics as formal axiology (in particular, formal ethics). In result, the classical metaphysics and ethics of moral rigor are represented as two-valued algebraic systems of metaphysics and formal ethics respectively. By means of this algebraic model, all the well-known scandal-making metaphysical tenets of Parmenides are produced as translations of corresponding algebraic equations from the symbolic language to the natural one. At the level of submitted discrete mathematical model of formal axiology, Parmenides' metaphysical (formal-axiological) concepts "consistency" and "inconsistency," "completeness" and "incompleteness" are compared with Gödel's logic ones.Formal-axiological meanings of the words "consistency," "incompleteness," "being," "nonbeing," "movement," "knowledge," "belief," etc., are considered as moral-evaluation-functions determined by one moral-evaluation-variable. Binary moral-evaluation-functions are studied as well. The functions are precisely defined by tables. Precise definitions of "formal-axiological-equivalence," "formal-axiological-law," and "formal-axiological contradiction" are submitted. Thus, one can either generate or examine formal-axiological equations of algebra of metaphysics by "computing" relevant compositions of moral-value-functions. Using this "moral-value-table-computation-technique," one can arrive to a surprising conclusion that both the notorious sentence of Moore (called "epistemic paradox") and the incompleteness sentence of Gödel are formally-axiologically inconsistent ones: Hence, they are formally-axiologically equivalent. For overcoming the negative psychological effect of such a surprising result, the author has used graphic models explicating the famous Łukasiewicz's statement "Logic is morality of thought and speech."

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“…This is related to a more serious problem, namely that the absurdity of Moore‐paradoxical belief cannot be adequately explained in terms of a pair of contradictory beliefs, with the result that neither account is able even to explain the absurdity of believing (Om). The irrationality of Moore‐paradoxical belief is surely severer than that of having a pair of contradictory beliefs (de Almeida, 2001, p. 43; Kriegel, 2004) for we may consistently suppose that I have contradictory beliefs because I am unaware of one or both of them. For example, a visit to a psychiatrist might unearth my long‐repressed belief that my mother was an adulterer that persists in the face of my sincere adult assertion that she was not.…”

Section: The Conscious Belief Approach: Rosenthal and Shoemakermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 4 The only other philosopher who explains the absurdity of Moore‐paradoxical beliefs in terms of epistemic notions such as justification is Claudio de Almeida, who argues that there can be no non‐overridden evidence for a Moore‐paradoxical belief (2001) and who uses six epistemic principles to argue that a Moore‐paradoxical belief makes one incoherent (2007). …”

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confidence: 99%

Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief

Williams

2010

Theoria

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In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Mooreparadoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Mooreparadoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that I believe that p. So if I have a conscious omissive Moore-paradoxical belief, then I have contradictory second-order beliefs. In their place, Vahid argues for the defectiveinterpretation approach, broadly that charity requires us to discount the utterer of a Mooreparadoxical sentence as a speaker. I agree that the Wittgensteinian approach is unsatisfactory. But so is the defective-interpretation approach. However, there is a satisfactory version of each of the epistemic and conscious-belief approaches.

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What Moore's Paradox Is About

Cited by 28 publications

References 17 publications

Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox

Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox

An Equivalence of Moore’s Paradox and Gödel’s Incompleteness Sentence in Two-Valued Algebra of Formal Ethics

Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief

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