What Nature Makes of Her: Kant's Gendered Metaphysics

Abstract

Women's exclusion from political enfranchisement in Kant's political writings has frequently been noted in the literature, and yet has not been closely scrutinized. More often than not, commentators suggest that this reflects little more than Kant's sharing in the prejudices of his era. This paper argues that, for Kant, women's civil incapacities stem from defects relating to their capacities as moral agents, and more specifically, to his teleological account of the conditions within which we, as imperfect beings, develop our moral capacities. Women are not incidentally or tangentially excluded from the boundaries of political and moral agency, but rather must adopt an explicitly nonmoral character if we are to understand humanity as moving toward its naturally given, moral ends. I argue (1) that Kant's teleological view of human development requires women to develop an explicitly nonmoral character; (2) that this teleology is inextricable from his view of the moral agency that human—and not merely rational—beings are capable of; and (3) that taken together, these suggest that women's subordinate status is internally connected to Kant's view of moral personhood.

Kant and Women

“…Another, related difference concerns the way in which I suggest that Kant's moral works accommodates these normative concerns; how, as we see below, he envisions his moral writings to accommodate his 'moral' (philosophical) anthropology. For a recent paper that also pays special attention to the teleological nature of Kant's account of gender, but comes to almost exactly opposite interpretive and philosophical conclusions, see Inder S. Marwah (2013). 4 The aim here is to outline Kant's own account of women, but towards the end of the article I will also show why, despite its strengths with regard to capturing the two prominent traditional genders, Kant's account is ultimately unsatisfactory as an account of sexuality, including gender.…”

“…Another, related difference concerns the way in which I suggest that Kant's moral works accommodates these normative concerns; how, as we see below, he envisions his moral writings to accommodate his ‘moral’ (philosophical) anthropology. For a recent paper that also pays special attention to the teleological nature of Kant's account of gender, but comes to almost exactly opposite interpretive and philosophical conclusions, see Inder S. Marwah ().…”

Kant’in Felsefesi̇nde Kadinin Yeri̇

“…www.kesitakademi.com "Kant'ın ortaya koyduğu dişil erdemlerin listesi tahmin edilemez değildir: Kadınların doğası sabır, duyarlılık ve tahakküm için itici bir arzu ile nitelenirken, erkekler duyarlılık, hoşgörülülük ve yöneticilik için daha uygundur." (Marwah, 2013). Fakat burada Kant'ın bahsettiği erdem onun ödev ahlakının teknik bir kavramı ile aynı anlamda kullanılmamaktadır.…”

“…"Böylece kadınlar, doğrudan ahlaki eylemde bulunmaktan ziyade ahlaki duyguyu uyararak ahlaki hayata dolaylı olarak katılırlar." (Marwah, 2013 Eserin en çok eleştirilen pasajlarından biri kadının velayet altında olması ile ilgilidir. Kant'a (1974: 79-80) göre bir insanın zihinsel yetileri yeterli olmasına karşın kamu uygulamalarındaki düzenlemeler ya yasal olarak reşit olmadığından uygun yaşa gelene dek ertelenmeyi ya da kendinin temsil edilmesini zorunlu kılan eksiklikler dolayısıyla bu tür konulara ancak temsilcisi vasıtası ile katılabilmeyi gerektirebilir.…”

Intersectionality as a Regulative Ideal

“…For more on Kant's sexism, see the papers collected in Schott (2007), especially Rumsey (2007). See also Marwah (2013).…”