2014
DOI: 10.1515/ercl-2014-0024
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What Role for Courts in Protecting Investors in Europe – A View from Finland

Abstract: Gerichte eine aktivere Rolle spielen bei der Entwicklung von Prinzipien, die sich aus der MIFID selbst ableiten lassen? Der Beitrag argumentiert, Gerichte sollten in der Tat ein Gegengewicht zum "Verwaltungsparadigma" im Europäischen Finanzrecht bilden und dieses "komplementieren" -wobei das neue MIFID-Regime mit einer stärker prinzipienbasierten Durchsetzungsphilosophie dem entgegenkommen könnte.

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Given the limited implementation capacity of supranational actors in this policy arena, it was predicted that EU legislators would explicitly empower and incentivize private litigants to independently enforce EU securities rules (Grace, 2005; Hertig & Lee, 2003; Kelemen, 2011; Kelemen & Sibbitt, 2004). However, contrary to these expectations, European securities re‐regulation has generally not directly expanded civil liability, or established new rights for private investors to enforce public rules against traders or corporate directors (Cherednychenko, 2020b; Marjosola, 2014; Moloney, 2012; Warren, 2011). This stands in stark contrast to the United States, where the foundational federal securities laws explicitly empower private actors to independently enforce the law: by suing companies that make material misstatements or omissions, suing traders that engage in market manipulation or deception, and recovering significant monetary damages for violations of security rules (Cox et al, 2004).…”
Section: Legalism Without Adversarialism In European Securities Regul...mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Given the limited implementation capacity of supranational actors in this policy arena, it was predicted that EU legislators would explicitly empower and incentivize private litigants to independently enforce EU securities rules (Grace, 2005; Hertig & Lee, 2003; Kelemen, 2011; Kelemen & Sibbitt, 2004). However, contrary to these expectations, European securities re‐regulation has generally not directly expanded civil liability, or established new rights for private investors to enforce public rules against traders or corporate directors (Cherednychenko, 2020b; Marjosola, 2014; Moloney, 2012; Warren, 2011). This stands in stark contrast to the United States, where the foundational federal securities laws explicitly empower private actors to independently enforce the law: by suing companies that make material misstatements or omissions, suing traders that engage in market manipulation or deception, and recovering significant monetary damages for violations of security rules (Cox et al, 2004).…”
Section: Legalism Without Adversarialism In European Securities Regul...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…EU mandates, from the Investment Services Directive of 1988 to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive of 2014 (MiFID II), have instead primarily worked within an “administrative paradigm” (Marjosola, 2014) that seeks to protect investors by strengthening public regulatory capacities. Although the specific details differ across policy areas, most EU securities legislation establishes common rules aimed at goals such as investor protection, market integration, and financial stability (Moloney, 2014).…”
Section: Legalism Without Adversarialism In European Securities Regul...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…53 See Sauter and Schepel (2009). 54 See, e.g., Cherednychenko (2014a), at pp 490-491; and, in more nuanced terms, Marjosola (2014), at pp 566-570. 55 Cf.…”
Section: Public Goals and Private Obligationsmentioning
confidence: 99%