What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

Hirji, Sukaina

doi:10.1111/phpr.12520

Cited by 17 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Hursthouse (1999) and LeBar (2013), have this structure. See Crisp (2015) and Hirji (2018) for arguments that, contrary to what is commonly thought, this is not the structure of Aristotle's moral theory. Ross (1930), moral rightness is explained by the five prima facie duties and their respective weights.…”

Section: Normative Prioritymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The fundamental divisions in ethics

Hammerton

2022

Inquiry

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What are the fundamental divisions in ethics? Which divisions capture the most important and basic options in moral theorizing? In this article, I reject the 'Textbook View' which takes the tripartite division between consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics to be fundamental. Instead, I suggest that moral theories are fundamentally divided into three independent divisions, which I call the neutral/relative division, the normative priority division, and the maximizing division. I argue that this account of the fundamental divisions of ethics better captures the main concerns that normative ethicists have when assessing moral theories. It also helps us make progress in comparative ethics and makes visible theoretical possibilities obscured by the Textbook View.

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Section: Normative Prioritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several moral theories inspired by Aristotle, such asHursthouse (1999) andLeBar (2013), have this structure. SeeCrisp (2015) andHirji (2018) for arguments that, contrary to what is commonly thought, this is not the structure of Aristotle's moral theory.…”

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confidence: 99%

The fundamental divisions in ethics

Hammerton

2022

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“… 13 See Hirji ( 2019 ) for the point that what is today standardly thought of as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics does not align with Aristotle’s ethics, even in some of its main tenets, either. As Hirji ( 2019 ) points out herself, this does not mean that neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is not convincing for independent reasons. See Hursthouse & Pettigrove ( 2023 ) for a formulation of standard neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics.…”

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confidence: 99%

Virtuous Collective Attention

Kaeslin

2024

Topoi

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How can a collective pay attention virtuously? Imagine a group of scientists. It matters what topics they pay attention to, that is, which topics they draw to the foreground and take to be relevant, and which they leave in the background. It also matters which aspects of an investigated phenomenon they foreground, and which aspects they leave unnoticed in the background. If we want to understand not only how individuals pay attention of this kind virtuously, but also collectives, we first need a framework to understand virtuous collective agency. A result of this article will be that virtuous collective action depends on the collective being institutionalized. At the same time, we have to think of the constituents of the collective in terms of practical identities (as opposed to individuals). This is what enables us to understand how a collective can acquire the stability required for virtue, and how we don’t end up with a summative account of group virtue, respectively. It will be argued that collectives only have the required stability in their actions when their commitments are habitualized in the form of institutionalized procedures. An Aristotelian understanding of virtue distinguishes between commitment, inclination, and action. Only when a subject’s inclination is fully lined up with her commitment, do we arrive at the required stability (of character) for virtuous action. In the case of individuals, to build up an appropriate inclination consists in an inscribing of the commitment into the feelings and body of the subject. If a commitment is fully ‘embodied’ in this sense, it has formed the individual’s inclination accordingly. How can one make sense of this in the case of collective subjects? This article tries to show that for collectives, the embodiment of commitment (the forming of the fitting inclinations) consists in creating policies, procedures, and rules that stabilize the acting according to the commitment, irrespective of the motivation of each individual involved in the collective. Hence, embodiment of commitment, in the case of collectives, is institutionalization. The article then explores what this requirement of institutionalization means for collective attention. The illustration will draw on a distinction between focused and open-minded attention. It will be shown that for either case – focused and open-minded – in order for a collective to pay attention virtuously, it needs to have its commitments institutionalized.

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“…Our (indefinite) universals guide us to consideration (“perception”) of particular features, but, in conjunction with this claim, “universals are arrived at from particulars” (1143b). For complications along these lines to the Aristotelian approach in contemporary ethics from scholars of Aristotle, see Moss (2014), Curzer (2016), and Hirji (2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Practical judgment as reflective judgment: On moral salience and Kantian particularist universalism

Bremner

2022

European J of Philosophy

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Moral particularists and generalists alike have struggled over how to incorporate the role of moral salience in ethical reasoning. In this paper, I point to neglected resources in Kant to account for the role of moral salience in maxim formation: Kant's theory of reflective judgment. Kant tasks reflective judgment with picking out salient empirical particulars for formation into maxims, associating it with purposiveness, or intentional activity (action on ends). The unexpected resources in Kantian reflective judgment suggest the possibility of a particularist universalism, where recalcitrant particulars directly inform, and in some cases revise, moral principles. Such an account improves on particularist accounts of moral salience and moral perception: rather than deriving moral sensitivity solely from an agent's upbringing or cultural resources, the reflective dimension is situated alongside the universalist dimension of moral principles typically identified with Kantian ethics, allowing for a critical approach both to moral universals and to the reception of moral particulars.

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What's Aristotelian about neo‐Aristotelian Virtue Ethics?

Cited by 17 publications

References 80 publications

The fundamental divisions in ethics

The fundamental divisions in ethics

Virtuous Collective Attention

Practical judgment as reflective judgment: On moral salience and Kantian particularist universalism

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