What's domain-specific about theory of mind?

Abstract

Twenty years ago, Baron-Cohen and colleagues argued that autistic performance on false belief tests was explained by a deficit in metarepresentation. Subsequent research moved from the view that the mind has a domain-general capacity for metarepresentation to the view that the mind has a domain-specific mechanism for metarepresentation of mental states per se, i.e., the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM). We argue that 20 years of data collection in lesion patients and children with autism supports a more parsimonious view closer to that of the 1985 paper. Lower-level domain-specific mechanisms--e.g., tracking gaze, joint attention--interacting with higher-level domain-general mechanisms for metarepresentation, recursion, and executive function can account for observed patterns of deficits in both autism and neurological patients. The performance of children with autism or orbitofrontal patients on ToM tests can be explained more parsimoniously by their deficits in lower-level domain-specific mechanisms for processing social information. Without proper inputs, the intact capacity for metarepresentation by itself cannot make correct ToM inferences. Children with autism have no impairment in false photograph tests because their metarepresentational capacity is intact and they have no impairment in inputs required for such tests. TPJ patients have equivalent deficits on ToM and non-ToM metarepresentational tasks, consistent with a failure in domain-general processing. If deficits on ToM tasks can result from deficits in low-level input systems or in higher-level domain-general capacities, postulating a separate ToM mechanism may have been an unnecessary theoretical move.

Determinants of theory of mind performance in Alzheimer's disease: A data-mining study

“…These deficits persist over time and also rapidly worsen in bvFTD patients with marked mPFC atrophy compared to those with limited mPFC atrophy (Kumfor et al, 2014). By contrast, the evidence for ToM impairment in AD has lacked general consensus on whether deficits on ToM tasks are a result of an authentic impairment of ToM (Cosentino et al, 2014;Freedman et al, 2013;Moreau et al, 2016), or due to deteriorating general cognition in the disease, an approach that is compatible with the interactive models of ToM (Dodich et al, 2016;Stone et al, 2006). Few studies in support of a stand-alone ToM deficit in AD have shown that AD patients could fail on basic ToM tasks like gaze-processing (Laisney et al, 2013) and inferring someone's (first-order false) beliefs (Freedman et al, 2013;Le Bouc et al, 2012).…”

“…A critical appraisal of such inconsistent results for determinants of ToM performance in AD suggests that such differences across studies largely arise due to variations in sample sizes, methodologies, and more importantly the design and complexity of the ToM task administered to the AD population (Bora, Walterfang, & Velakoulis, 2015). arguing that the ability to infer mental states relies on the interaction between lowlevel domain-specific and high-level domain-general mechanisms such as EF (Samson, 2009;Stone & Gerrans, 2006). In that view, efficient complex mental attributions are dependent on a contextual social framework integrating relevant information gathered in the environment by low-level processes (Achim et al, 2013).…”

“…The representation and maintaining of others' mental states is rather be the result of low-level mechanisms dedicated to socially-relevant information gathered from the perceptual environment (e.g. gaze direction, body movements, emotional facial or vocal expression) interacting with high-level domain-general functions such as memory, language, or EF (Achim, Guitton, Jackson, Boutin, & Monetta, 2013;Samson, 2009;Stone & Gerrans, 2006). Complex ToM tasks that supposedly impose greater load on high cognitive functions may thus be failed because of general cognitive deficit, such as EF impairments.…”

A three-component framework for empathic technologies to augment human interaction

“…This is in line with the definition of Decety and Jackson [45], who describe this cognitive process as an important part of empathy. Cognitive empathy has also been called internal state empathy [138,182], mentalizing [163], and theory of mind [155]. Empathic accuracy is the accuracy of cognitive empathic inferences [92], and therefore strongly related to cognitive empathy.…”

Sense of agency and mentalizing: Dissociation of subdomains of social cognition in patients with schizophrenia

“…Mentalizing is commonly thought to be a complex social-cognitive process that depends on the development of several precursor mechanisms (Frith and Frith, 1999, Stone andGerrans, 2006).…”