Dressing up animals in ridiculous costumes, shaming dogs on the internet, playing Big Buck Hunter at the local tavern, feeding vegan food to cats, and producing and consuming "knockout" animals, what, if anything, do these acts have in common? In this article, I develop two respect-based arguments that explain how these acts are morally problematic, even though they might not always, if ever, affect the experiential welfare of animals. While these acts are not ordinary wrongs, they are animal dignitary wrongs. 1 | INTRODUCTION One puzzling ethical question is whether, and how, you can be wronged by an act if it does not affect your experiential welfare. As Angela Martin (2019) notes, there is widespread agreement that the unnoticed infringement of human privacy and mocking of unaware humans are wrong, even if no humans are affected mentally or physically by these actions. She moreover claims that these kinds of acts directly wrong the humans who are the objects of the acts. Yet she insists that neither the unnoticed infringement of animal privacy nor the mocking of unaware animals directly wrong particular animals. 1 She thus avers that we "do not owe it to a particular animal to refrain from such actions" (Martin, 2019, p. 83). On Martin's view, stalking animals, mocking animals, painting the fur of animals, dressing animals up in ridiculous ways, treating animals as mere sources of amusement, and spitting on animals wrong particular animals only when these acts impact their experiential welfare. So, according to Martin, if we do these things without impacting the experiential welfare of animals, the actions themselves are morally permissible. 2 Martin is not alone. Bonnie Steinbock (1999), for instance, claims that while it is an affront to human dignity to enslave humans, even if they are treated "nicely," there is a different story to be told when it comes to animals. Presumably, on Steinbock's view, enslaving "happy" animals does not violate animal dignity because animals do not desire dignity. Likewise, Bernard Rollin (1998) argues that while it is permissible to change the telos of animals through genetic engineering, so long as we do not make them worse-off, it would be wrong to alleviate human suffering by genetically engineering humans to be happy. While Martin, Steinbock, and Rollin seem to assume that animals cannot be subject to what I call dignitary wrongs, other animal ethicists suggest that animals have dignity and, consequently, can be wronged when their experiential welfare is not negatively affected. Sarah Gavrell Ortiz (2004), for instance, advances a dignity-based