What’s Love Got to Do with It? Parental Involvement and Spouse Choice in Urban India

Mathur, Divya

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1655998

Cited by 15 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Using data from Ankara, Turkey, Hortaçsu (1999) finds couple-initiated marriages to be more prevalent among husbands and wives with higher educational levels and among working women. Similar patterns are reported by Mathur (2007) who finds that living in a joint family, owning a family business, lower educational attainment, lower levels of labor force participation, and traditional values and lifestyle are positively correlated with the probability of women having arranged marriages in Mumbai, India. Emran et al (2014) use war disruptions and spatial indicators of schooling supply in Vietnam as instruments for education and find a negative relation between schooling and arranged marriages: the effect is stronger for women compared to men.…”

Section: How Do People Get Married?supporting

confidence: 79%

“…In exogamous marriage systems, which require individuals to marry outside the group that they are born into, this trade-off may be weaker since marriages could be used to strengthen and extend network ties and create new ones (Luke and Munshi, 2006). Mathur (2007) makes use of a two-stage bargaining model to understand the choice of matchmaking mechanism. Her starting assumption is that parents and children differ with respect to their preferences for spousal attributes and that arranged marriages reflect parental preferences while love matches reflect the children's preferences.…”

Section: How Do People Get Married?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Anukriti

Dasgupta

2017

The Oxford Handbook of Women and the Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Marriage Markets in Developing Countries FebruAry 2017Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9 53113 Bonn, GermanyPhone: +49-228-3894-0 Email: publications@iza.org www.iza.org IZA -Institute of Labor EconomicsDiscussion PaPer series IZA DP No. 10556 Marriage Markets in Developing CountriesFebruAry 2017 S AnukritiBoston College and IZA Shatanjaya DasguptaBeloit College Marriage Markets in Developing Countries 1This chapter reviews the literature on marriage in developing countries. We describe how marital matching occurs; the trends in age at marriage; assortative mating patterns; marriage payments; and spousal decision-making after a marriage has occurred. Lastly, we discuss trends and rationales for consanguineous and polygamous marriages -practices that are largely unique to the developing world. JEL Classification:J1, J12

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Section: How Do People Get Married?supporting

confidence: 79%

Section: How Do People Get Married?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Anukriti

Dasgupta

2017

The Oxford Handbook of Women and the Economy

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“…This is feasible in the Indian context given the involvement of parents, particularly the mothers, in selecting the bride/groom of their offspring, often without the direct involvement of the bride and groom (Mathur 2007). If this is the case, a similarity in son preference between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law should be observed immediately after marriage.…”

Section: [Figures 1 To 2 About Here]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mothers-in-Law and Son Preference in India

Robitaille

Chatterjee

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…Throughout most of India, a woman's social status and identity was signifi cantly correlated with marriage, and most marriages were arranged by parents. Arranged marriages combined with extremely low age at marriage generally lowered the bargaining power of women relative to parents and the extended kin group (Agarwala 1957;Mathur 2007).…”

Section: Kinship Institutions In Indiamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the level of the joint family, marriages also threatened the break-up of the family property because wives had an incentive to seek partition of joint property. By severely restricting the rights of women, the northern system limited the power of women to exercise their autonomy over their husbands and joint family (Mandelbaum 1970;and Mathur 2007).…”

Section: Political and Kinship Organization In Punjabmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

Chakraborty

Kim

2010

Demography

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This article explores the relationship between kinship institutions and sex ratios inver since Sen (1990) proclaimed that more than 100 million women are missing around the world, referring to the abysmally low fraction of women in the total population, the case of "missing women" has generated considerable interest. In contrast to Europe and North America, where the male-to-female sex ratio is 0.95 (favoring the presence of females), the ratio in many Asian countries -such as India, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea-is as high as 1.06, signifi cantly favoring the presence of males. 1 Moreover, in many of these countries, the male-to-female sex ratio seems to have risen over the second half of the twentieth century with economic development, declining family size, and the advent of technologies that facilitate self-selective abortion or sexselection (Park and Cho 1995).In India, and possibly elsewhere in Asia, however, the case of missing women has deep historical roots (Dyson and Moore 1983). Although identifying when the problem of missing women fi rst arose in India is diffi cult, British offi cials were well aware of the problem in North India during the mid-nineteenth century. 2 More reliable evidence from the British India censuses conducted during the late nineteenth century shows that this problem was clearly a northern rather than a southern or an eastern problem. The male-to-female sex ratio was highest in northern regions, such as Punjab; relatively equal in eastern regions, such as Bengal; but relatively low and favored women in southern regions, such as colonial Madras (Dyson and Moore 1983;Visaria 1961). 3 Although the regional difference in sex ratios narrowed between the northern and southern regions during the twentieth century, the narrowing is largely due to the convergence of southern sex ratios toward the northern fi gures. For all of India, the overall sex ratio increased from 1.03 to 1.07 between 1901 and 2001. During this period, however, the sex ratio in the historically most-masculine Punjab region in the North, ranging from *Tanika Chakraborty, DIW-Berlin, Mohrenstrasse 58, Berlin 10117; e-mail: tchakraborty@diw.de. Sukkoo Kim, Washington University and National Bureau of Economic Research. We gratefully acknowledge Bob Pollak and three anonymous referees for providing us with extremely valuable comments. We thank Karen Norberg, David Rudner, and seminar participants at the Work, Family and Public Policy workshop at Washington University and also at the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank Lauren Matsunaga and Michael Scarpati for research assistance and Cassie Adcock and the staff of the South Asia Library at the University of Chicago for their generous assistance in data collection. We are also grateful to the Weidenbaum Center and Washington University (Faculty Research Grant) for research support and to CRES at Olin School of Business for their generous conference funding. All errors are ours.1. B...

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What’s Love Got to Do with It? Parental Involvement and Spouse Choice in Urban India

Cited by 15 publications

References 32 publications

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Mothers-in-Law and Son Preference in India

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

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