What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience

Morris, Kevin

doi:10.1111/phib.12125

Cited by 15 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…from necessitarian versions of dualism, physicalists need to explain why the physical by itself metaphysically necessitates the phenomenal (see Horgan 1993;Morris 2018). They…”

Section: Physicalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revelation and the intuition of dualism

Liu

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is a broad consensus among philosophers that when we think about the nature of consciousness, there is a persistent and plausibly widespread intuition of dualism -a belief or a disposition to believe that consciousness is nonphysical. This dissertation addresses the intuition of dualism and what explains it. The main body of the dissertation focuses on expounding a rational explanation of our dualistic intuition by drawing on what is known as the 'thesis of revelation' in the philosophy of mind, the claim that the essences of phenomenal properties are revealed in phenomenal experiences. The thesis of revelation, as I clarify, is incompatible with physicalism. Furthermore, as I argue, it is part of our ordinary conception of experience and its intuitiveness is what underlies our intuition of dualism. In my dissertation, I also defend the thesis of revelation from existing and potential objections.The dissertation is divided into three main parts. Part I introduces the theme of the dissertation (chapter 1), elucidates the intuition of dualism (chapter 2), and critically assesses a number of candidate explanations of the intuition (chapter 3). Part II is dedicated to sharpening our understanding of revelation (chapter 4), clarifying its alleged incompatibility with standard versions of physicalism (chapter 5), and putting forward a linguistic argument for its intuitiveness (chapter 6). Discussion of these issues helps to bring forth a rational explanation for the intuition of dualism in terms of the intuitiveness of revelation (chapter 7). The issues of whether similar intuitions of distinctness can arise in other areas and of what explains the intuitiveness of revelation are also addressed (chapter 7). Parts I and II complete the main narrative of the dissertation. Part III deals with some further issues regarding revelation. It addresses objections against the revelation argument against physicalism and the thesis of revelation itself (chapter 8). It also provides a preliminary defence of property dualism, a position compatible with revelation, from the exclusion problem (chapter 9).

show abstract

“…from necessitarian versions of dualism, physicalists need to explain why the physical by itself metaphysically necessitates the phenomenal (see Horgan 1993;Morris 2018). They…”

Section: Physicalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revelation and the intuition of dualism

Liu

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For related critiques of supervenience-based versions of nonreductive physicalism, see Horgan 1993 andWilson 2005. While I believe that supervenience is not the key to securing a viable nonreductive physicalism, I also believe that the issues here are more nuanced than certain discussions suggest; for discussion, see Howell 2009and Morris 2018aand 2018b. 6 See Kim 1998 For related ideas, see Lewis 1966, Heil 2003, and Morris 2018b Second, Kim argued that nonreductive physicalism cannot make sense of the causal efficacy of putative higher-level items, focusing his case on the issue of mental causation, the causal efficacy of mental items like thoughts, beliefs, desires, and experiences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

What’s Wrong With Nonreductive Physicalism? The Exclusion Problem Reconsidered

Morris¹

2022

ProtoSociology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Jaegwon Kim argued that nonreductive physicalism faces the “exclusion problem” for higher- level causation, mental causation in particular. Roughly, the charge is that given the presumptive ubiquity of physical causation, there cannot be irreducible mental causes for physical effects. Since there are mental causes, Kim concluded that nonreductive physicalism should be rejected in favor of a more reductionist alternative according to which mental causes are just physical causes differently described. But why should mental causes be “excluded” in this way? Unfortunately, Kim had less to say about this than one might expect. After reviewing some of Kim’s proposals, I suggest that the exclusion problem should be premised on nothing more or less than Occamist, simplicity-based considerations. I apply this conception of the exclusion problem to some prominent responses to Kim’s critique of nonreductive physicalism and argue that this conception mandates reconsidering the success of these responses.

show abstract

Mental causation as joint causation

Won

2019

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience

Cited by 15 publications

References 39 publications

Revelation and the intuition of dualism

Revelation and the intuition of dualism

What’s Wrong With Nonreductive Physicalism? The Exclusion Problem Reconsidered

Mental causation as joint causation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About