What Seemings Seem to Be

Taylor, Samuel A.

doi:10.1017/epi.2015.18

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Even alleged deniers of intuitive phenomenology, Williamson (2007) and Sosa (2007), maintain that there is something it is like to intuit; however, they differ from many of the above authors in that they also maintain that this phenomenology is exhausted by what it's like to be consciously inclined to accept a proposition and what it's like to entertain a proposition, respectively. 5 For more views that also suggest spontaneity, see Lycan (1988), Bealer (1998), Gopnik and Schwitzgebel (1998), Goldman and Pust (1998), Kornblith (2002), Nichols, Stich, and Weinberg (2003), Goldman (2007), Bengson (2015), and Taylor (2015).…”

Section: Mainstream Propositionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interpreting Intuitions

McGahhey

Leeuwen

2018

Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative

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We argue that many intuitions do not have conscious propositional contents. In particular, many of the intuitions had in response to philosophical thought experiments, like Gettier cases, do not have such contents. They are more like hunches, urgings, murky feelings, and twinges. Our view thus goes against the received view of intuitions in philosophy, which we call Mainstream Propositionalism. Our positive view is that many thought-experimental intuitions are conscious, spontaneous, non-theoretical, non-propositional psychological states that often motivate belief revision, but they require interpretation, in light of background beliefs, before a subject can form a propositional judgment as a consequence of them. We call our view Interpretationalism. We argue (i) that Interpretationalism avoids the problems that beset Mainstream Propositionalism and (ii) that our view meshes well with empirical results in contemporary cognitive science.

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Section: Mainstream Propositionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interpreting Intuitions

McGahhey

Leeuwen

2018

Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative

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“…For a more detailed discussion of the nature of seeming and of reasons to think they are conscious inclinations to believe (or at least not sui generis states), seeTaylor (2015) orByerly (2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

Inference to the best explanation and the challenge of skepticism

Appley¹

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This dissertation considers the problem of external world skepticism. Some say that we have good reason to believe that the ordinary world of 3D objects exists. They argue that the ordinary world is the best method available to us to explain our ordinary experiences of walking around, going to work and driving our cars. I argue that those who argue this fail to appreciate how well views like the hypothesis that we're in a Matrix-world explain our experiences. As far as human beings are concerned, we're just as likely to be in the Matrix as we are to be in the real world. vi

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Phenomenal Conservatism

Moretti

2020

Seemings and Epistemic Justification

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Phenomenal conservatism is the view according to which, roughly, the way things seem or appear to be is a source of epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, for instance, one can have some justification for believing that the cat is on the mat simply because it seems visually to one that the cat is on the mat. 3 The central intuition of the phenomenal conservative is that one should grant that things are the way they appear to be unless one has reasons for doubting it. Phenomenal conservatism is internalist in character at least because it takes the seeming-based justification of one's beliefs to depend entirely on one's mental states (cf. Huemer 2006(cf. Huemer , 2011(cf. Huemer , 2014. 4 Phenomenal conservatism is customarily associated with Michael Huemer's work. Huemer defines phenomenal conservatism as follows:(PC) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in absence of defeaters S thereby has some degree of justification for believing that P. (2007: 30) 5Although (PC) is about S's propositional justification, there is a corresponding version of it about S's doxastic justification: 61 Thanks to Tommaso Piazza and Chris Tucker for helpful comments on drafts of this paper. I'm grateful to the Von Humboldt Foundation for financial support through a Visiting Fellowship at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy.2 For a general introduction to phenomenal conservatism and cognate views see Tucker (2013b). A more elementary introduction is Huemer (2014). A rich anthology of phenomenal conservatism and related views is Tucker (2013a).3 Phenomenal conservatism must not be confused with doxastic conservatism, which says that one's mere believing that P gives one some justification for P provided that one has no reason for doubting that belief (cf. Huemer 2014: §1d.

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What Seemings Seem to Be

Cited by 7 publications

References 32 publications

Interpreting Intuitions

Interpreting Intuitions

Inference to the best explanation and the challenge of skepticism

Phenomenal Conservatism

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