What Shapes Corporate Involvement in Voter Referendums? The Case of Opposition to GM Food Labeling

Banerjee, Tarun; Murray, Joshua

doi:10.1177/0731121414566888

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…We do this because theories on the unity of business argue that the collective interests of business are generated and led by the largest, most influential corporations, rather than business as a whole (Domhoff 1967; Mintz and Schwartz 1985; Mizruchi 1992; Useem 1984). Focusing on the Fortune 500 is therefore standard in the research and allows us to relate our findings to prior studies (e.g., Banerjee and Murray 2015; Clawson and Neustadtl 1989; Dreiling and Darves 2011; Mizruchi 2013). Our final sample excludes a few firms which lacked complete board of director data, leaving a final sample at 488 corporations, all of which were among the largest 500 corporations in the United States in 2012.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Policy groups are important for two reasons. First, research finds that the policy network continues to shape the interests of affiliated firms and engenders greater similarity of behaviors between connected firms (e.g., Banerjee and Murray 2015; Burris 2005; Domhoff, Staples, and Schneider 2013; Dreiling and Darves 2011). Second, policy groups attract the very same members key to class-unity ascribed to the pre-fracturing period: inner circle directors.…”

Section: The Persistence Of Alternative Sources Of Broad Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is because it is quite difficult to measure class-wide rationality. Instead, much of the quantitative research focuses on measuring (1) political strategies assumed to represent class-wide rationality (e.g., Clawson and Neustadtl 1989; Murray 2014); (2) the effect of mechanisms assumed to be associated with class-wide rationality, such as interlocking directorates (Banerjee and Murray 2015; Mintz 1995); or (3) dyadic similarity as a measure of unity, as unity is the assumed result of class-wide rationality (Banerjee and Burroway 2015; Dreiling and Darves 2011; Mizruchi 1992; Murray 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Class Dominance or Fracturing? Sources of Broad Interest in Lobbying by Fortune 500 Corporations

Banerjee

Murray

2020

Sociological Perspectives

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Are large corporations able to transcend individual self-interest in favor of a broad class interest, as suggested by class dominance theorists? Or, has the corporate elite become fractured? We address this ongoing debate through a unique case: the determinants of the breadth of corporate lobbying of the U.S. federal government. As predicted by the fracturing thesis, we find that financial companies no longer have a broader political interest than nonfinancial companies. However, we also find that mechanisms still exist that foster a broader class-wide interest. Specifically, a firm’s embeddedness in the interlocking directorate and policy-planning networks is associated with broader lobbying activities. Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that the interests of large corporations have become more globalized: firms with more global operations have greater breadth of lobbying activities. We therefore theorize that while banks no longer play the same role in diffusing a broadened interest through the capitalist class, alternative mechanisms continue to fulfill this role. Together, these findings demonstrate continued support for the class dominance thesis, even in the light of any fracturing of the corporate elite.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%