What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?

Huber, Franz

doi:10.1007/s10992-014-9314-x

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Huber (2014bHuber ( , 2017 introduces so-called alethic ranking functions and defines counterfactuals in terms of them. Raidl (forthcoming) proves completeness results for these and other semantics, and corrects mistakes in Huber (2014bHuber ( , 2015bHuber ( , 2017. Alethic ranking functions are related to subjective ranking functions by "the royal rule."…”

Section: Areas Of Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 79%

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Weirich

2021

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Suppose I am deliberating whether I should live on a boat and sail the Caribbean for a year. This is a decision not to be taken lightly. Many factors will matter for my decision. Several of these depend on uncertain states of the world. Will I be able to make a living? Is my boat really seaworthy? Will I miss my friends? How bad will the next winter be in my home town?1 I understand decision-making under 'uncertainty' here to refer to any case where an agent is not certain what the consequences of her actions will be, or what state will come about. A distinction is sometimes made between risk, uncertainty, ignorance and ambiguity, where 'risk' refers to the case where objective probabilities are known, 'uncertainty' refers to the case where an agent can make a subjective judgement about probabilities, an agent is in a state of 'ignorance' if she cannot make such probability assignments, and 'ambiguity' occurs when an agent can make probability assignments for some states, but not others.12 Risk aversion is further discussed in Section 5.3. Also see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), chapter 6 for more detail on expected utility theory's treatment of risk aversion. 13 This is why von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory is sometimes referred to as a theory of decision-making under risk, and Savage's is referred to as a theory of decision-making under uncertainty. In the former, probabilities are already known, in the latter, subjective probabilities can be assigned by the agent. However, note that, as we pointed out above, von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory can also be applied when probabilities are subjective.49 See, for instance, Wakker (1988). 50 See McClennen (1990) for a characterisation of different dynamic choice rules.

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Section: Areas Of Future Researchmentioning

confidence: 79%

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Weirich

2021

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“…When restricting to the non-nested conditional language, the latter two semantics are indistinguishable from VT and VP, respectively, correcting the claimed completeness of V in Huber (2014) and Spohn (2015). The third direction investigated modifications of the trivial-truth clause for impossible-antecedent conditionals, as suggested by Huber (2014Huber ( , 2015Huber ( , 2016. A standard conditional is trivially true for an impossible antecedent.…”

Section: Alternative Ranking Semanticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Halpern (2003)). It has been philosophically discussed and motivated by Huber (2014Huber ( , 2015Huber ( , 2017. Spohn (2015) develops his own version and Lauer (2017) uses it to analyse graded belief as a graded modality.…”

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confidence: 99%

COMPLETENESS FOR COUNTER-DOXA CONDITIONALS – USING RANKING SEMANTICS

Raidl

2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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Standard conditionals $\varphi > \psi$, by which I roughly mean variably strict conditionals à la Stalnaker and Lewis, are trivially true for impossible antecedents. This article investigates three modifications in a doxastic setting. For the neutral conditional, all impossible-antecedent conditionals are false, for the doxastic conditional they are only true if the consequent is absolutely necessary, and for the metaphysical conditional only if the consequent is ‘model-implied’ by the antecedent. I motivate these conditionals logically, and also doxastically by properties of conditional belief and belief revision. For this I show that the Lewisian hierarchy of conditional logics can be reproduced within ranking semantics, provided we slightly stretch the notion of a ranking function. Given this, acceptance of a conditional can be interpreted as a conditional belief. The epistemic and the neutral conditional deviate from Lewis’ weakest system $V$, in that ID ($\varphi > \varphi$) or even CN ($\varphi > \top$) are dropped, and new axioms appear. The logic of the metaphysical conditional is completely axiomatised by $V$ to which we add the known Kripke axioms T5 for the outer modality. Related completeness results for variations of the ranking semantics are obtained as corollaries.

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“…3 Counterfactual conditionals express propositions about the relative counterfactual distance of various factual propositions to some factual world. They are closely tied to causation (Lewis 1973b;Collins et al 2004;Huber 2013) and they relate to what statisticians call the mode of a sample much like chances relate to relative frequencies (Huber 2015b). The big question is, of course, what these counterfactual distances are like.…”

Section: Counterfactual Conditionals and Modal Idealismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What to do in order to avoid believing a falsehood about the modal status of a factual proposition is explained inHuber (2015b).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why follow the royal rule?

Huber

2016

Synthese

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This note is a sequel to Huber (Synthese 191:2167(Synthese 191: -2193(Synthese 191: , 2014. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.

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What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?

Cited by 3 publications

References 42 publications

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities

COMPLETENESS FOR COUNTER-DOXA CONDITIONALS – USING RANKING SEMANTICS

Why follow the royal rule?

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